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I. INTRODUCTION

Approximately seventy-five percent of all older Americans are
grandparents.' The number of grandparents is growing rapidly as the baby
boomer generation ages. There were fifty-eight million American
grandparents in 1991 and that number is expected to grow to ninety-eight
million in 2001 2As the number of grandparents increases, so does the rate
of breakdown in American marriages. In 1988, more than one in five
households with dependent children was a single parent household, up
from fewer than one in ten in 1960.' With the increased rate of divorce also
comes an increase in the number of stepfamilies and the estrangement of
extended families.4 As a result of these changes in the makeup of the
American family, the societal perception of the importance of grandparents
in the American family has also changed.5 For instance, the popular media
constantly depicts sentimental images of grandparents in strong loving
families.6 Also, the powerful pull of the elderly lobby led to a joint

1. S.Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong. (1983), reprintedin 10 Fain. L. Rep. 3027 (BNA 1984).
2. Megan Rosenfeld, Grandparents'Rights; Activists Turn to Court to ProtectTheir Ties
to Grandchildren,WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at Z12. The numbers have also been reported as 58
million in 1992 predicted to be at 98 million in 2020. SUBCoMM. ON HUMAN SERVS. OF HOUSE
1
SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 102d CONG., GRANDPARENTS: NEW ROLES AND RESPONSmL1
(Comm. Print 1992).
3. Constance Sorrentino, The Changing Family in InternationalPerspective, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 41, 49. "The divorce rate in this country more than tripled from 1960 to
1982." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL
STUDY SERIES P-20, No. 380, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1982, at 4
tbl. D (1983).
4. Ann Marie Jackson, The Coming ofAge of GrandparentVisitationRights, 43 AM. U. L.
REv. 563, 563-64 (1994).
5. ANDREWJ. CHERUN&FRANKF. FURSTENBERG,JR.,THENEWAMERICANGRANDPARENT
4-5 (1986). Policymakers often consider the roles of grandparents when drafting legislation dealing
with the family. At a congressional hearing where the generational bonds between grandparents and
other family members was the topic of discussion, Norma Downey testified: "'Grandparents'
Rights' are critical to a society where children often live with one parent, where divorce has reached
astronomical proportions, and feeling secure is a vanishing emotion." GrandparentsRights:
PreservingGenerationalBonds: Hearing Before the Subcomnm on Human Servs. of the House
Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong. 103 (1991) (hereinafter Hearings).
6. CHERLN & FURSTENBERG, supra note 5, at 4.
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resolution of Congress in 1978 asking the President to-proclaim a national
Grandparents' Day.7 The fact that only eight House members dared to
oppose the legislation demonstrates the strength of the sentimental
grandparent image and the power of the grandparent lobby.8 In the opening
statement of a hearing before the House of Representatives concerning
grandparents' rights, Representative Thomas Downey remarked, "It is a
well known fact that seniors are the most active lobby in this country, and
when it comes to grandparents there is no one group more united in their
purpose." 9 With the longevity,'0 as well as the sheer number, of
grandparents increasing (becoming a more sizeable voting body) and the
media portraying them-as so necessary in young lives, the elderly lobby has
stepped up to make grandparent visitation a priority on their senators' and
representatives' agendas."
This Note is a survey of the grandparent visitation movement
nationwide, concluding with a focus on the development of grandparent
visitation statutes, and their future, in Florida. Part II outlines the common
law rules regarding grandparent visitation before state legislatures began
codifying rights to petition for visitation. Part Ill follows the codification
of the law and the problems inherent in the broad variations of statutes
created by the states. Part IV outlines the ways in which courts have
interpreted grandparent visitation statutes in various jurisdictions. Part V
explains the evolution of Florida's grandparent visitation statute. Part VI
explains the privacy provision of Florida Constitution, the foundation upon
which parents have based attacks on Florida's grandparent visitation
statute. Part VII tracks the Florida Supreme Court's dismantling of the
most recent Florida grandparent visitation statute. Finally, Part VIII
suggests what direction the Florida legislature should take in response to
the Florida Supreme Court's decisions.

7. National Grandparents Day, Designation Authorization, Pub. L. No. 95-325,92 Stat. 398

(1978).
8. CHERuN & FURSTENBERG, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Hearings,supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Downey).
10. See Christopher M. Bikus, One Step Forward,Two Steps Back: The NebraskaSupreme
CourtPerpetuatesthe UncertaintySurroundingthe GrandparentVisitationStatute in Eberspacher
v. Hulme, 533 N.W.2d 103 (1995), 75 NEB. L. REv. 288, 291 (1996).
11. Remarking on the influence of the senior lobby observers- have noted that "[s]tate
legislators who worked for grandparents' rights undoubtedly were motivated by the increasing
proportion of older voters.... Voting against grandparents is political suicide." CHERLIN &
FURSTENBERG, supra note 5, at 5; see also Hearings,supra note 5, at 3 (Rep. Snowe stated that
"[t]he older population, of which an estimated seventy-five to eighty-five percent are grandparents,
are [sic] retiring earlier, living longer, and are becoming more politically active in promoting
grandparent-related issues.").
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II. THE COMMON LAW: To GRANDMOTHER'S HOUSE THE
CHILDREN DID NOT Go
The reason the elderly lobby pushed so hard for grandparent visitation
legislation is that, under the common law, grandparents had no right to
visit their grandchildren; only moral obligation forced parents to allow
grandparent visitation. 12 The common law rule of allowing parents to
decide on visitation rights, absent a special circumstance, is designed to
protect the interests of the child and to protect parental autonomy. 3 One
commentator's justification for the common law rule is that a child's
interests "are not furthered by forcing the child into the center of the
conflict between parent and the grandparents." 4 Another view is that "the
coercive measures which follow judicial intervention" do not create better
family ties.' 5
The common law doctrine is also based on the parental rights doctrine,
which is primarily founded on a policy of protecting parental autonomy.' 6
The argument behind the parental rights doctrine is that where parents and
grandparents conflict, parents should be the exclusive judges regarding
visitation without having to explain to anyone their motives for denying

12. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1069 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1987); King v. King, 828
S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992); L.F.M. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 507 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986); Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199,201 (N.J. 1975); In re Whitaker, 522 N.E.2d 563,566
(Ohio 1988); Grover v. Phillips, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984); In re Adoption of R.D.S., 787 P.2d
968, 99 (Wyo. 1990). "The right to determine the third parties who are to share in the custody and
influence of and participate in the visitation privileges with the children should vest primarily with
the parent who is charged with the daily responsibility of rearing the children." Chodzko v.
Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Il. 1976). The rationales for the common law position that
grandparents do not have a legal right of visitation have been summarized as follows:
(1) Ordinarily the parent's obligation to allow the grandparents visitation is a
moral and not a legal one; (2) judicial enforcement of a grandparent's visitation
rights would divide parental authority, thereby hindering it; (3) the best interests
of the child are not furthered by forcing the child into the center of the conflict
between the parent and the grandparents; (4) where there is a conflict between
grandparent and parent, the parent alone should be the judge, without having to
account to anyone for his motives in denying visitation; and (5) the ties of nature
are the only efficacious means of restoring normal family relations and not the
coercive measures which follow judicial intervention.
Henry J. Foster & DorisJ. Freed, GrandparentVisitation: Vagariesand Vicissitudes,5 J. DIVORCE
79,81-82 (1982).
13. Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of GrandparentVisitation RightsPromote the
Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of GrandparentVisitation Laws in the Fifty States, 27
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 319, 328 (1994).
14. Foster & Freed, supra note 12, at 81.
15. Id. at8I-82.
16. See id.
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visitation, and a parent's right to prevail over the wishes of a grandparent
should not be encroached upon by courts. 7 Hence, under the common law,
a child's attachment to his grandparents may be subordinated to the rights
of parents to cut off contact or the value of attachment between grandchild
and grandparent may be lost because of animosity between parents and
grandparents. 8 Based upon underlying theories such as these, the common
law grants no right of visitation to grandparents as a function of their status
as grandparents. 9
However, as with most rules, exceptions exist. The general exceptions
to the common law rule of parental discretion called for visitation to be in
the best interest of the child.20 These exceptions allowed courts to override
the decision of the parents not to allow grandparental visitation and fell
into three major categories: (1) where there was an agreement or
stipulation as to visitation, as for example, in a divorce proceeding; (2)
where the child resided with the grandparent (for example, where the child
and custodial parent both resided with the grandparents and the custodial
parent has now died and the surviving parent seeks custody); and
(3) where
21
it is demonstrated that the parent seeking custody is "unfit.",
Before grandparent visitation statutes conferred any kind of visitation
rights on grandparents, courts of equity would sometimes grant visitation
if either the facts fell into a general exception or there were special
circumstances.' When courts found circumstances warranting the
imposition of grandparent visitation in the absence of a statute conferring
such visitation, those circumstances uniformly included the presence of an
established, close, and meaningful relationship between the grandparent
and grandchild.' Examples of special circumstances that courts have found
to justify court-ordered visitation have included: a grandparent's daily
contact with the child following the death of the child's parent, 24 the death
of a father in World War II and a provision in the father's will that his
parents act as trustees of a fund for the benefit of his child, 2 the inability
of a father to exercise visitation because of his military assignment in a
distant state, 26 and the agreement of the maternal and paternal grandparents

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Bostock, supra note 13, at 330.
Id.
Id.
Foster & Freed, supra note 12, at 81.
Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60, 63 (I11.
1976).
Edward M. Bums, GrandparentVisitation Rights: Is it Time for the Pendulum to Fall?,

25 F m.L.Q. 59,62 (citing Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652, 654 (11. App. CL 1981)).
24. Id.; see also Boyles v. Boyles, 302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Il1.App. Ct. 1973).
25. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi. 71 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ill.App. Ct. 1947).
26. Solomon v. Solomon, 49 N.E.2d 807, 808 (111. App. Ct. 1943); Skeens v. Patemo, 480
A.2d 820, 823 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
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to allow the paternal grandparents visitation with their common orphaned
grandchild prior to the paternal grandparents' consenting to the adoption
of the child by the maternal grandparents.27 Absent a finding of a general
exception or special circumstance, courts were bound by the common law
and forced to uphold parental decisions to deny otherwise loving
grandparents the opportunity to visit with their grandchildren.
I. THE MOVE TO LEGISLATION: GRANDMOTHER GETS PROACTIVE
Concern by grandparents regarding their right to visitation has mounted
over the years such that by 1983, four national grandparents' rights
organizations had formed.28 As a united front, these grandparents besieged
their legislators with requests to pass laws which would give them rights
to visit their grandchildren. 29 These organizations were successful, as
evidenced by the fact that, as of May 1994, all fifty states had enacted
some type of grandparent visitation rights statute.

27. Loveless v. Michalak, 522 N.E.2d 873, 874 (1988).
28. Bums, supra note 23, at 59.
29. Id.
30.' See ALA.CODE § 30-3-4.1 (1989); ALASKASTAT. § 25.20.065 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-337.01 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); CAL FAM. CODE §§ 31033104 (Deering 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1995);
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (1999); FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3
(1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46.3 (1999); IDAHOCODE § 32-719 (Michie 1999); 750 ILL COMP.
STAT. 5/607 (1998); IND.CODE § 31-17-5-1 (1999); IOWACODE § 598.35 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-129 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344
(West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1803 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 9-102 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D (1996); MICH. CoME. LAws § 722.27b
(Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1998); MISS. CODEANN. § 93-16-3 (1994); Mo.REV. STAT.
§ 452.402 (Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802
(1998); Nav. REV. STAT. § 125C.050 (Supp. 1999); N.H.REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1999); N.Y. DOM.
REL LAW § 72 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2A (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-0905.1 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (Anderson Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5
(Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5311 (1994); R.I. GE.
LAWS § 15-5-24 (Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-52 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991) (found
unconstitutional under Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,582 (Tenn. 1993)); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.435 (Vernon Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011
(1993); VA. CODE § 20-124.2 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 26.09.240 (1999); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2B-4 (1999); Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1993); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie
1999).
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A. Varieties of Statutes: How the Road to Grandmother's
Became Long and Winding
State visitation statutes vary widely in both requirements and effects,
but they all fit into at least one of three broad classes. 3' The first class
requires death or divorce of the parents, or loss of parental rights. 32 This
class of statutes appears to only codify the common law exception of
special circumstances. 33 Classes two and three are considered "openended" statutes because they do not require any special circumstances.34
Instead of a child-centered focus, as in the first class, these two classes
focus on the grandparents. 35 The second class of statutes allows visitation
regardless of the status of the child's nuclear family situation. 36 This
second class of statutes gives grandparents visitation rights as a function
of their status as grandparents.37 The third class of statutes allows visitation
regardless of the child's nuclear family situation, but only so long as a
substantial relationship existed between the grandparent and grandchild

31. Mark Moody, Constitutional Questions Regarding Grandparent Visitation and Due
Process Standards,60 MO. L. REv. 195, 208 (1995).
32. See ARrz. REv. STAT. § 25-337.01 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998);
CAL. FAM. LAW CODE §§ 3103-3104 (Deering 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1999); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1995); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (1999); FLA. STAT. § 752.01
(1997); GA. CODEANN. § 19-7-3 (1993); 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/607 (1998); IND. CODE § 31-175-1 (1999); IOWACODE § 598.35 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:344 (West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1803 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 119, § 39D (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27b (Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 257.022
(1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.050 (Supp. 1999);N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-9-2 (Michie 1999); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 72 (McKinney 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.051 (Anderson Supp. 1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5311 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24
(Supp. 1999); TEX. FAM. CODEANN. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2000); UTAHCODE ANN. § 30-5-2
(1998); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, § 1011 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie 1999); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2B-4 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1999).
33. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
34. Sarah Norton Harpring, Wide-Open Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Is the Door
Closing?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1659, 1660-61 (1994).
35. Bostock, supra note 13, at 337.
36. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.1 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46.3 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 32719 (Michie 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 9-102 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1997);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993) (declared
unconstitutional in Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291 (N:D, 1999)); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5
(Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIIED LAWS § 25-4-52 (Michie 1999); TEM. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991)
(found unconstitutional in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993)); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-5-2 (1998); Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1993).
37. See Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691, 695 (Conn. 1990).
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prior to the denial of visitation rights by the parents. 38 This third class
allows for the substantial relationship to form an independent basis for
standing, unlike the common law, which called for a substantial
relationship plus a general exception or special circumstance. 39 Advocates
of this third type of statute feel that emphasizing the existing relationship
between the grandparent and grandchild more closely ties legal rights to
the best interests of the child.4" Some states even went so far as to allow
visitation by any person, regardless of biological relation.4
Within the three basic categories of visitation statutes there are many
variations of subcategories. Within each subcategory, there are more
narrowly tailored requirements for establishing standing to petition for
visitation. Several statutes require an existing or past relationship between
the grandparent and child to permit standing or to grant visitation rights.4 2

38. ALASKASTAT. § 25.20.065 (1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3103-3104 (Deering 1994); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1803 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1998); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-16-3 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1994);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5311 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24 (Supp. 1996); TEX. FAM. CODEANN.
§ 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-4 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101
(Michie 1989).
39. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
40. Foster & Freed, supra note 12, at 84.
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994). These
statutes will likely be amended in the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel v. Granville,
120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 103-19 for a discussion of Troxel.
42. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (Deering 1994) ([I]n certain circumstances, a court may order
visitation rights to grandparents if the court "[finds that there is a preexisting relationship between
the grandparent and the grandchild that has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best
interest of the child."); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (Michie 1983) (repealed in 1994) ("When a
grandparent or grandparents have established a substantial relationship with a minor child, the
district court may... grant reasonable visitation rights to said grandparent or grandparents."); IOWA
CODE § 598.35(6) (1994) ("A petition for grandchild... visitation rights shall be granted only upon
a finding that the visitation is in the best interests of the child and that the grandparent... had
established a substantial relationship with the child prior to the filing of the petition."); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-129(a) (1986) ("Ihe district court may grant ... reasonable visitation rights.., upon
a finding that the visitation rights would be in the child's best interests and when a substantial
relationship between the child and the grandparent has been established."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19A, § 1803(1)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1993) ("A grandparent... may petition the court for
reasonable rights of visitation ... if [t]here is a sufficient existing relationship between the
grandparent and the grandchild... or... a sufficient effort to establish one has been made.");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(2) (Supp. 1993) (Grandparents who do not meet certain other
requirements for standing may be granted standing by a chancery court and granted visitation rights
if the court finds that they have established a "viable relationship" with the child, which is defined
under § 93-16-3(3).); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1988) ("Reasonable rights of visitation may
be granted when the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that there is, or has been,
a significant beneficial relationship between the grandparent and the child, that it is in the best
interests of the child that such relationship continue, and that such visitation will not adversely
interfere with the parent-child relationship."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13,2(bl), -13.2A, -13.5(j)
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Other statutes require that, as a prerequisite to any visitation under any

circumstance, there be a substantial relationship between the child and the
person seeking visitation rights.4 3 Still other statutes only partially require
a relationship (i.e., some circumstances that permit standing do not also
require a relationship while other circumstances require a relationship
coupled with the special circumstance in order to grant standing)." Some

statutes do not condition standing on the basis of a relationship between
the grandparent and grandchild; rather, the statute requires the court to take
into consideration the relationship as part of the court's ultimate decision.4'

(1987) (As used in these provisions, "the term 'grandparent' includes a biological grandparent of
a child adopted by a stepparent or a grandparent and the child."); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121(l)(a)
(1999) (Grandparents may petition the circuit court for visitation rights if "(A) [t]he grandparent
has established or has attempted to establish ongoing personal contact with the child; and (B) [t]he
custodian of the child has denied the grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the child.").
43. IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (Michie 1983) (repealed 1994); IOWACODE § 598.35(7) (1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129(a) (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1988).
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1803(1) (West 1993) (stating that a"sufficient existing
relationship" permits standing to petition for visitation, while a grandparent may also have standing
if a parent of the child is deceased or the grandparent has made a sufficient effort to establish
sufficient relationship); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-16-3(2) (Supp. 1993) (When other circumstances
allowing automatic standing do not exist, grandparents may petition the chancery court and
visitation may be granted, provided that "the grandparent of the child had established a viable
relationship with the child and the parent... unreasonably denied the grandparent visitation rights
with the child."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2(bl), -13.2A, -13.5(j) (1987) (As used in these
provisions, the term "grandparent" to include a biological grandparent of a child adopted by a
stepparent or a relative "where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the
child." This appears to say that in situations in which there has been such an adoption, there is an
additional requirement ofa substantial relationship.); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121(1)(a)-(b) (1993)
(According to § 109.121(1)(a), grandparents who petition for visitation generally must allege an
established ongoing relationship or an attempt to establish one. Under § 109.121(l)(b), after the
commencement of a domestic relations suit, grandparents may petition for visitation and the law
makes no reference to the relationship between grandparent and grandchild.).
45. CAL FAm. CODE § 3102 (Deering 1994) (When grandparents seek visitation rights with
respect to a child or children of their deceased child, "the court shall consider the amount of
personal contact between the [grandparent] and the child before the application .. "); FtA. STAT.
§ 752.01(2)(b) (1994) ("In determining the best interest of the minor child, the court shall
consider.... (b) [t]he length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the
grandparent... ."); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.7-3(b) (1992) ("In determining the best interests of the
child under this section, the court may consider whether a grandparent has had, or has attempted
to have, meaningful contact with the child."); MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1992) (Grandparents may
petition for visitation rights if the child has resided with them for specified periods of time. In other
circumstances permitting standing, the court shall consider the amount of personal contact between
the grandparent and child.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.330 (1993) (In determining whether to
grant visitation rights to grandparents, the court shall consider the "love, affection and other
emotional ties existing between the party seeking visitation and the child."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17-d(II)(c) (1992) (providing that, in making a visitation order, the court shall consider,
among other factors, the nature of the relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (B)-(C) (West 1993) (In making a determination of visitation, courts must
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B. Expansion of Rights: The Road Widens
Since their initial enactment, visitation statutes have undergone rapid
change."6 Recent amendments to visitation statutes show that grandparent
visitation rights are expanding.47 In 1989, fourteen states had laws that did
not specify or restrict circumstances under which grandparents could
petition for visitation; 48 that number increased to twenty-one by 1993. 4"
Along with the expansion of the number of statutes which allow broad
grounds for standing, the number of statutes which do not make
grandparent visitation rights derivative of parental rights has also
increased. Twenty-one states had provisions that conditioned grandparent
visitation rights on the grandparent's relation to the child's parents in
1989.50 Six of these conditioned every basis for standing on such a
relationship.5 ' In 1994, only fourteen states had provisions that explicitly
conditioned visitation rights on the grandparents' relationship to the child's

consider the relationship between the grandparent and grandchild. If the grandparent has been a
full-time caretaker for the child, it is prima facie evidence that visitation is in the best interests of
the child.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1991) ("The court shall consider the amount of
personal contact that has occurred between the grandparents... and the minor...."); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(b)(1) (1989) (In determining the best interests of the child, the court must
consider the "love and affection and other emotional ties existing between the grandparents
involved and the child."); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-5 (1992) ("In determining the appropriateness of
granting visitation rights to a grandparent... the court shall consider the amount of personal
contact between the grandparent and minor child prior to the filing of the petition.").
46. AMERICANBARASSOCIATION,GRANDPARENTVSrrATIONDIS'urES: ALEGALREsOURCE
MANUAL 5 (Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp eds., 1989) (hereinafter RESOURCE MANUAL).
47. See, e.g., Bostock, supra note 13, at 342-47. States that expanded grandparent visitation
statutes in 1993 amendments included: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey and North Dakota.
48. Id. at 319-21.
49. CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986); DEL CODEANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1994);
FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1995); IDAHOCODE § 31-1008 (Michie 1993) (repealed as of July 1. 1994);
KANSTAT. ANN. §§ 38-129, -120,60-1616 (1986 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021
(Michie 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-1004 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 9-102 (1993); MISS. CODEANN. § 93-16-3 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1993); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 72 (McKinney 1994) (as interpreted in Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 560 N.Y.S.2d 211, 214
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5
(1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-420 (Law. Co-op. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991) (This section was found
unconstitutional in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,582 (Tenn. 1993).); UTAHCODEANN. § 30-52 (1993); WiS. STAT. § 767.245 (1993).
50. RESOURCE MANUAL, supranote 46, at 10.
51. Id.
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parents. 52 Of those, only one statute conditioned standing
on the
53
grandparents' relationship to the child in all circumstances.
The vast majority of amendments to state visitation statutes after 1989
were expansive. For instance, Florida added to its statute that grandparents
may petition for visitation when parents in intact families use their parental
authority to prevent a relationship between the grandparent and
grandchild.5 4 Hawaii added a provision which allowed for a petition for
visitation outside of actions for divorce, separation, annulment, separate
maintenance, or other custody actions.5 Arkansas, California, Georgia,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, and Utah also expanded their current statutes to give
grandparents greater visitation rights.56 The grandparental rights movement

52. See Bostock, supra note 13, at 342 n.102. The states which explicitly conditioned a
grandparent's standing to petition for visitation on the grandparent's relationship with the child's
parents were: California, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West Supp. 2000).
54. FLA STAT. § 752.01(e) (This section was ruled unconstitutional in Beagle v. Beagle, 678
So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996).).
55. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46.3 (1993).
56. See, e.g., Bostock, supra note 13, at 345-47. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103
(Michie 1993) (expanding the circumstances allowing grandparent visitation to include situations
in which the child is in the custody of a person other than a parent); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3102 (West
1993) (Previously grandparents could only be awarded visitation in proceedings for dissolution of
marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal separation of the parties; after the amendment
visitation rights could be awarded to a grandparent in any custody proceeding.); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-7-3 (Michie 1993) (Prior to the amendment, grandparents could seek visitation in cases in
which there was a court proceeding regarding the custody of a child, a divorce of a parent or parents
of the child, terminations of parental rights of a parent of the child, visitation of the child, or
whenever there had been an adoption of the child by a blood relative of the child; after the
amendment, grandparents could also seek visitation with grandchildren who had been adopted by
a stepparent.); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.7-2 (1993) (Prior to the amendment, Indiana law only allowed
grandparents whose own child had died or whose child was a non-custodial parent to petition for
visitation; new law allows any grandparent to seek visitation if a parent of the child has died, if the
parent's marriage has been dissolved, or if the child is born out of wedlock.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1003 (West 1993) (The pre-amendment version of the statute allowed visitation "if at least
one of the child's parents or legal guardian has died"; the newly amended version allows visitation
if one of the child's parents or guardians has died or if there is sufficient relationship between the
grandparent and grandchild, or if no such relationship exists, then a sufficient effort has been made
to establish one.) (renumbered to tit. 19A, § 1803 after amendment); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 9-102 (1991) (Statutes changed to a general provision.); MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1994) (This
amendment added a provision that visitation could not be denied simply because of allegations that
it interferes with parent-child relationship.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1993) (This statute
repealed the provision that required petitioning grandparents to pay all costs that arose from their
petitions, including courts costs, attorney's fees, and guardian ad litem fees.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:2-7.1 (West 1993) (Previously, standing would only be granted if a parent had died or if the
parents had separated or divorced; following this amendment a grandparent could petition for
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appears to have great momentum, as only two states proposed amending
their grandparent visitation statutes to restrict grandparent rights.57
However, as will be discussed later, although legislatures across the nation
are responding to the grandparental rights movement by expanding
grandparent visitation statutes, state courts are striking down some of those
expansions soon after they are made."
C. Moves Toward Uniformity: Equal Rights for
GrandparentsEverywhere
Although the grandparental rights movement has worked hard to
procure the expansion of grandparent visitation rights, the resulting
"potpourri of laws" among the states has led grandparents and their
advocates to call for uniform laws. 59 In the hope of spurring Congress to
create a uniform federal law concerning grandparent visitation,
grandparents' rights activists gathered and testified before a Senate
subcommittee in 1984. 60 The testimony was unsuccessful in engendering
support for a uniform bill in the Senate, and members of the grandparent
visitation group felt that the members of the subcommittee opposed

visitation for any reason and all he had to do was prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
visitation was in the best interest of the child.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993) (The old
statute read that grandparents "may" be granted visitation upon application and afinding that such
visitation is in the best interests of the child; this amendment changed "may" to "must" unless it is
found.that visitation is not in the best interest of the child.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24 (1988) (The

previous statute required that a grandparent have repeatedly attempted to visit the grandchild over
a twelve-month period before a court granted visitation; the amendment reduced this period to six
months.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (1992) (The amendment allows grandparents to petition
courts to remedy "a parent's wrongful noncompliance with a visitation order.").
57. H.B. 962, 1993 Reg. Ses., 1993 La. Acts 344 (The new statute would no longer provide
for visitation in the event ofadivorce ofthe parents.); H.B. 443, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Il.
1993) (The law would be changed to include provisions which qualify the rights of grandparents
who are related to the grandchild through a parent against whom a court has issued an order
restricting visitation or prohibiting visitation; under the amendment, if grandparents under those
circumstances use their visitation rights to facilitate contact between the parent and the grandchild
in contravention of such an order, their visitation rights may be revoked. Also, all visitation orders
issued to grandparents related to the grandchild through a noncustodial parent would have a
provision specifying that if they use their visitation rights to facilitate contact between the
grandchild and the noncustodial parent, the order will be permanently revoked.).
58. For instance, the 1993 addition to the Florida grandparent visitation statute was held
unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court three years later in Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d
1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996).
59. Rosenfield, supra note 2, at ZI 3 (quoting Arthur Komhaber, a New York psychiatrist
who is active in the grandparents' rights field).
60. Harpring, supra note 34, at 1679 (citing Deloris T. Ament, Sometimes, Grandparents
Must Battle to Win Closeness, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 9, 1990, at K2).
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helping them because the bill involved parental rights, which is a state law
matter.6
Because Congress can only operate at the federal level, it can only use
indirect measures to influence state policy and lacks general authority to
legislate on state law matters. 2 Congress could, however, adopt a
concurrent resolution urging states to enact legislation reflecting a uniform
policy. 63 Such a resolution would have no legal force or effect, but it could
have a positive impact on state law reform.M Congress could also choose
to precondition the receipt of federal funding on each state's compliance
with the specified conditions.' The practical effect of such preconditioning
would be limited, however, since the conditions must have some nexus to
the funding.6
Congress has not completely ignored the need for uniformity among
grandparent visitation statutes. The Subcommittee on Human Services of
the House Select Committee on Aging held hearings in 1982 and 1983 on
the issue of grandparents' visitation rights.67 The product of these hearings
was House Concurrent Resolution 67, which called for a uniform state act
to be developed and enacted. 68 The resolution was adopted by both the
House and Senate in September 1986.69 However, fourteen years later there
is still no uniform state act; instead there is a "potpourri" of state statutes.
In light of the broad variation in the area of grandparent visitation
statutes, grandparents are not the only ones seeking uniformity. The
American Bar Association (ABA) also supports the idea of a uniform
grandparent visitation policy and has suggested guidelines for achieving
consistency. 70 These guidelines emerged from a year-long collaboration
amongst the ABA's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, the
ABA's Family Law Section, and the National Legal Resource Center for
Child Advocacy and Protection. 7' The guidelines were created in an effort
to provide basic principles to help judges decide grandparent visitation
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1680 (citing GINA MARIE STEVENS & GLORIA SUGARS, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: LEGAL OVERVIEW OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS, in SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN
SERVS. OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG., GRANDPARENTS RIGHTS: A
RESOURCE MANUAL 65, 91-105 (Comm. Print 1992)).

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67.

RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 46, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Harpring, supra note 34, at 1685 (citing ABA COMMISSION ON LEGALPROBLEMS OF
THE ELDERLY, ABA POLICY RESOLUTION AND COMMENTS ON GRANDPARENT VISITATION, in
RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 46, at 121 (hereinafter ABA COMM'N)).

71, ABA COMM'N, supra note 70, at 126.
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disputes.7" They include urging all legal professionals involved in the
dispute to encourage mediation before the filing of any court action.73 If an
action is filed, the guidelines state that a judge should refer the parties to
mediation if the judge feels that mediation could achieve a satisfactory
resolution.7 4 The ABA also recommends that state legislatures provide
courts with specific factors to use in determining whether visitation will be
in the child's best interest. 75 The guidelines include a recommendation that
either court rules or state legislation should require that guardians ad litem
be appointed for children involved in visitation disputes.7 6 Finally, the
recommendation provides that the child's wishes should be a factor for
consideration as long as the child is capable of forming and expressing an
opinion.'
The uniformity called for by the ABA provisions would lead to greater
fairness in the dispensation of visitation grants to grandparents since
variation from state to state can cause trouble for grandparents, especially
those who choose to move upon retiring. One critic who advocates
uniformity argues that "[tihe ability of grandparents to visit with their
grandchildren, and vice versa, should not depend on the state in which the
grandchild lives. 7 8 Two forms of relief for grandparents are the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (adopted by every state) and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, which require states to give full faith and
credit to child custody and visitation decrees issued by other jurisdictions;
however, the relief is not complete since these acts do not address the
factors courts must consider when issuing custody and visitation orders,
instead addressing only the enforcementof custody and visitation orders.7 9

72. Id.
73. 1l at 121; see also Harpring, supra note 34, at 1694 n.182 (citing Elaine D. Ingulli,
GrandparentVisitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 295, 298
(1985)).
Ingulli asserted that there is a need for states to reevaluate and to amend
legislation in order to avoid litigation, but that this is not a reason to support
uniform legislation. Her position is that diversity is appropriate because of the lack

of generally accepted social science findings concerning the importance of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship and the recentness of the rights involved.
Id.
74. ABA COMM'N, supra note 70, at 122.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 123.
77. Id. at 121-23.
78. Harpring, supra note 34, at 1687.
79. See id.; see also STEVENS & SUGARS, supranote 62, at 87-88. These acts make it possible
for a person who obtains a visitation order in any state "to have that order enforced throughout the
country, unless all parties have left the Uurisdiction of the court issuing the order] or other
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IV. CASE LAW INTERPRETATIONS OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION
STATUTES: THE "LEGISLATIVE SLEIGH" PLUNGES HEADLONG
INTO THE WIDE AND DRIFTING INTERPRETATIONS

Analysis of the variations created by the statutes is only the beginning
of understanding the complexity of grandparent visitation. Once statutes
started being challenged, courts stepped in and added to the confusion. To
a grandparent the issue is excruciatingly simple. The grandparent wants to
see his grandchild and is being denied that contact because of what he
perceives to be an unwise decision of his child or child-in-law." To a
grandparent, the distinction between statutes that require a disruption in the
intact family and statutes that allow for visitation rights even in intact
family situations is arbitrary.8 ' Grandparents cannot control whether their
adult children remain married, get divorced, or die; thus, deciding whether
they should be awarded visitation privileges on these bases appears both
capricious and unfair. Therefore, grandparent visitation advocates feel that
a wide-open visitation statute is always preferable to one based on special
circumstances.82 If sentiment were the only factor involved, it is likely that
few would argue. However, grandparent visitation statutes implicate
parents' constitutional rights to child-rearing autonomy. 3 Just as the
statutes vary, case law interpreting those statutes is equally diverse.
A. United States Supreme CourtRulings
Many state courts base their rulings on grandparent visitation cases on
the Federal Constitution, as opposed to a provision of their state
constitutions." In the cases where the court is deciding whether the statute
circumstances exist which deprive the original court ofjurisdiction." Id. at 88. While this eliminates
the problem where a parent moves with the child to defeat a grandparent visitation order, other
problems such as court congestion, a parent's frequent changing of address, a parent's continual
seeking of modification of the original order, etc. still manage to thwart uniform enforcement of
visitation orders. See id.
80. It goes without saying that a grandparent who seeks to visit with his grandchild and who
is denied visitation by the decision of the parent will likely feel that the parent's decision is unwise,
wrong, unfair, etc.
81. See, e.g., Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691, 694-95 (Conn. 1990).
82. Harpring, supra note 34, at 1691.
83. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054,2060 (2000).
84. Cases such as Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 286 (N.D. 1999) (holding a 1993
amendment to North Dakota's grandparentvisitation statuteunconstitutional) and King v.King, 828
S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (holding Kentucky's grandparent visitation statute constitutional)
based their rulings on the United States Constitution, while cases such as Hawk v. Hawk, 855
S.W.2d 573,575 (Tenn. 1993) (holding Tennessee grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional)
and Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996) (holding subsection (e) of Florida's
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional) base their holdings on the more restrictive privacy
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is constitutional based on the Federal Constitution, the most basic
argument parents assert is that grandparent visitation statutes violate a
parental right to child-rearing autonomy. Parental autonomy is a liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment under its prohibition
against
deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without due process of
85
law."
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of parental
autonomy in a number of cases over the years and has always used strict
scrutiny when deciding those cases.8 6 In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska," the
Court declared that parental autonomy rights are fundamental. 8 Meyer
concerned the right of a parent to challenge a statute which prohibited
teaching a foreign language to a child until after the child had passed the
eighth grade.89 The Court stated that the Constitution prevented "legislative
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the state to effect."' Although this language
seems to implicate rational basis review, the Court appeared to use a higher
level of review and ex1licitly declared the child-rearing right to be
fundamental. 9 The Court wrote, "It]hat the state may do much, go very far
indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally
and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected."92 If the Court had used rational basis as the
standard of review, then the analysis would have focused on whether the
statute in question was rationally related to improving the physical, mental,
or moral well being of citizens, not whether the statute properly respected
a fundamental right of an individual. 93
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,94 the Court again ruled
on parental autonomy, holding that child-rearing is a fundamental right. 9
provisions of their states' constitutions.
85.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens ofthe United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONSTr. amend. XIV, § 1.

86. See id. and accompanying text; infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
87. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
88. Id. at 399-400.
89. Id. at 396-97.
90. Id. at 400.
91. Seeid.at:401.
92. id.
93. Moody, supra note 31, at 202.
94. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
95. Id. at 534-35.
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The Court held that the statute in question, which required parents to send
their children to public school, infringed on the parental autonomy right
and was unconstitutional.
The Court continued to uphold parental autonomy as fundamental in
cases such as Prince v. Massachusetts,' where the Court stated that:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.... And it is in recognition of this
that these decisions have respected98 the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.
Again, in Lassister v. Department of Social Services of Durham
County,9 the Court expressed that the right to raise a child as a parent sees
fit is fundamental: 'This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond
the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children' is an
important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection. ""00
From these decisions it is clear that the United States Supreme Court
affords parental autonomy the substantive protections provided for by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because child-rearing autonomy is a fundamental
right and enjoys substantive protections afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no state may constitutionally intrude upon that right without
a compelling reason to do so, and the means of intrusion must be narrowly
tailored. 01 The United States Supreme Court has held that a compelling
justification for state intervention arises only when children would
otherwise be exposed to a threat of serious harm.0

96. M.
97. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
98. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
99. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
100. Id. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
101. Prince,321 U.S. at 166.
102. Id. In Prince, a minor child's aunt, who was also her legal guardian, was convicted of
violating a state law prohibiting minors from publicly offering merchandise for sale because she
allowed the child to distribute religious literature on the street. Id. at 158, 162. She argued such
conduct was a protected exercise of religious expression with a claim of parental right. Id. at 164.
The Court affirmed her claim to parental autonomy under virtually all circumstances except when
circumstances place a child in imminent danger, or affect his well-being. Id. at 167. Under such
circumstances, the Court held the state could properly intrude on that "private realm of family life"
to protect the child from harm. Id. at 166. The Court found the statute at issue was justified by such
a danger. Id. at 169-71. This exception is a narrow one, which the Court later said in Yoderis to be
equated with "severe" evils and "substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Wisconsin v.
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While the United States Supreme Court has declared child-rearing to
be a fundamental right,- therefore cases involving child-rearing rights,
like most other fundamental rights cases, should receive strict scrutiny
analysis-the Court has avoided setting any kind of model for state courts
and lower federal courts regarding grandparent visitation statutes. In fact,
the Court avoided grandparent visitation cases twice before granting
review and deciding a case in June 2000.103 Although the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Troxel v. Granville,t°' the Court's
ruling provided lower courts with little guidance as to how to address
grandparent visitation statute cases.
In Troxel, the Court examined Washington's grandparent visitation
statute, which allowed "any person" to petition for visitation at "any time"
and authorized state superior courts to grant visitation rights whenever
"visitation may serve the best interest of the child."' 05 The case was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court by the Troxels, the
grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie Granville, after the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that the Washington statute violated the Federal
Constitution by infringing on the fundamental right of parents to rear their
children.106
The Troxel's son, Brad, was the girls' father." Brad never married the
girls' mother, and the relationship ended in 1991.108 Brad lived with his
parents and regularly brought the girls to the Troxel's home for weekend
visits." In 1993, Brad committed suicide." 0 The girls' mother, Tommie
Granville, allowed the Troxels to visit with the girls on a regular basis for
five months, but then decided that she wanted to limit the visits to one
short visit per month."'
The Troxels commenced a lawsuit two months later under section
26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, seeking greater
visitation rights.112 Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, called the

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230 (1972).
103. See Laurie Asseo, Court to Rule on a Search Run Illegally, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3,

1992, at 3. Within a three-week period, the Court left intact the Wisconsin grandparent visitation
statute and the Kentucky statute applied in King by denying certiorari for both. ka ("The justices,
without comment, rejected arguments that a Wisconsin law unconstitutionally interferes with
parents' right to raise their children as they wish.").
104. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
105. Id. at 2057-58.
106. Id. at 2058.
107. Id. at 2057.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Washington statute "breathtakingly broad" and ruled that the statute, as
applied, violated Granville's fundamental parental right to make3 decisions
concerning the "care, custody, and control" of her daughters."
Because the Court struck down the statute as applied, it avoided
addressing two key issues: (1) the standard of review to be applied to
grandparent visitation cases, and (2) the scope of parental due process
rights in the grandparental visitation context." 4 The Court did, however,
give some guidance to lower courts. The Court stated that there is a
presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children." 5 The
Court then asserted that so long as a parent is fit, "there will normally be
no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent's children."'" 6 Such guidance is
hollow, however, because the Court, despite using the term "fit" several
times, never defined the term.
The Court stated that the problem was not that the Washington Superior
Court intervened in granting a visitation award, but rather when the award
was granted the court gave no special weight to the mother's determination
of her daughters' best interest." 7 The Court openly disapproved of the
Washington Superior Court's placing the burden on the mother to disprove
that visitation would be in the best interest of the children." 8 The Court
made nothing totally clear in the Troxel decision other than the need to
place special weight on a fit parent's own determination as to visitation." 9
In the wake of Troxel some states may choose to narrow overly broad
visitation statutes. But lower courts will continue to struggle in
adjudicating grandparent visitation cases because the highest court in the
land has shied away from giving any real guidance.2 ° As the discussion

113. Id.at 2060-61.
1,14. Id. at 2064 ("Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of§ 26.10.160(3) and
the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not consider the primary
constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process
Clause requires all non-parental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm
to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define today
the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context.").
115. Id. at 2062.
116. Id. at2061 (emphasis added). The Court was careful to temper its statement, thus leaving
open the possibility that even the decisions of fit parents might be overruled by a court's decision.
See id.
117. Id. at 2062.
118. Id.
119. See id. ("[I]f a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial
review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination.").
120. Justice Stevens argued in dissent that it is appropriate that no guidance be given by the
Supreme Court. He said, "[i]t is indisputably the business of the States, rather than a federal court
employing a national standard, to assess in the first instance the relative importance of the
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below shows, this struggle by lower courts has led to a broad spectrum of
holdings based on an equally broad spectrum of rationales.
B. Standardsof Review
Case law which deals with grandparent visitation statutes varies in
several different aspects, especially in the application of a standard of
review.' The level of review applied by a court is a pivotal factor in
determining the constitutionality of a statute. 22 Courts have responded to
the constitutional argument of parents in one of three basic ways: (1) to
dismiss the parents' constitutional argument, (2) to use an undue burden
analysis, or (3) to use strict scrutiny. 23
The first approach, taken by several jurisdictions, is to dismiss the
parents' constitutional argument by holding that parental rights must give
way when necessary to promote the child's welfare. 24 Courts taking this
approach reason that the parents are depriving the grandchildren of
something beneficial-a visit with their grandparents-and that it is within
the state's police power to overrule the parental decision because it is in
the best interest of grandchildren to see their grandparents.'5 Since most

conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this." Id. at 2073 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
went on to quote language from other Supreme Court decisions warning that the Supreme Court
should use great caution in making decisions in the areas of child custody, citingPalmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984), and matters involving competing and multifaceted social and policy
decisions, citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992), because those
decisions should be made at the local level. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2074 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
said that there is "a premise that people and their intimate associations are complex and particular,
and imposing a rigid template upon them all risks severing bonds our society would do well to
preserve." Id.at 2073 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While Justice Stevens raised valid points, he also
ignored the vast array of decisions and rationales being applied to cases across the country. See id.
(Stevens, J.,
dissenting). A majority of cases are being decided with the Federal Constitution in
mind, and the Federal Constitution is a subject matter area where the Supreme Court should feel
comfortable making decisions.
121. Joan Catherine Bohl, GrandparentVisitation: Over the River and into the Courts, 35
TRIAL 28, 30 (1999).
122. E.g., Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285,289 (N.D. 1999) (stating that, in order to decide the
constitutionality ofNorth Dakota's grandparent visitation statute, the court must first determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny).
123. Bohl, supra note 121, at 30.
124. Id. at 28. All grandparent visitation statutes presuppose fit parents; if the parents were
unfit then the state's child welfare legislation would address the situation. Id.
125. In State ex rel.Sibley v. Sheppard,429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981), the Court of Appeals
of New York ruled that "[p]ermitting grandparent visitation over the adoptive parents' objection
does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family." Id. at 1052. After
the death of Willie Sheppard's mother, Willie was adopted by his paternal grandparents. See id. at
1049-50. The court found that the paternal grandparents, despite having adopted Willie, stood in
an equal legal position as the natural parents would have against a maternal grandparent when
asserting the parental child-rearing right. See id. at 1052. The court based its decision, in part, on
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every grandparent visitation statute permits visitation to be granted when
it is in the "best interest" of the child, this kind of justification is easy for
a court to make, if it so chooses." 6
This method of deciding cases is in direct contrast to the directives set
forth by the United States Supreme Court. Critics of this approach point
out that the United States Supreme Court, in cases like Meyer v.
Nebraska, 7 Prince v. Massachusetts,"8 Ginsberg v. New York, 129 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder 3° directed that a court must find a harm from which
the child needs to be protected in order to intrude upon the "private realm
of family life."'' While the vagueness and breadth of what kind of harm
is necessary to justify intrusion are subject to criticism, these critics stress
that the importance of these decisions is that the Court speaks in terms of
harms from which children need to be protected, rather than in terms of
providing better lives for children.' 32 In a more recent decision, Troxel v.
Granville,the Supreme Court remained in that same vein of thought when
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority, stated that "[i]t is not within
the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the
custody of children merely because it could make a 'better' decision [than
the parents].' 33
Yet when courts have decided cases based on the state's police powers
to intrude on family life, they have relied on a "best interest of the child"
standard. 134 Critics argue that if the state is allowed to rely on this standard
alone, then it is the logical equivalent of saying that the state has the power
to break up stable families and redistribute the child population to provide

the state's role in the adoption process, stating that "[t]the adoptive relationship... is soley the
creature of statute, unknown to the common law." Id. The court went on to say that "[p]rotecting
the best interest of a child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power." Id. at 1053.
126. Bostock, supra note 13, at 332.
127. 262 U.S. 390,403 (1923) ("[P]roficiency in a foreign language... is not injurious to the
health, morals or understanding of the ordinary child.").
128. 321 U.S. 158,170 (1944) (upholding the conviction of a guardian who allowed her child
to sell religious magazines, finding legitimate state interference because the statute was designed
to prevent "psychological or physical injury" to the child, and the child was found to be in danger
of such harm).
129. 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968) (upholding conviction for selling obscene materials to
minors).
130. 406 U.S. 205,236 (1972) (finding that Amish children would not be harmed by receiving
an Amish education rather than a public education).
131. Prince,321 U.S. at 166.
132. E.g., Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 U.
LouisVuE J. FAM. L. 393, 410 (1985-86).
133. 120 S.CL 2054,2059 (2000) (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21,31 (Wash.
1998)).
134. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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each child with the "best family." 135 When state courts use such a standard
to allow grandparent visitation when parents oppose the visitation,
realistically, the state is not honoring parental autonomy. One critic is
particularly pointed in her criticism:
[T]o delegate to the parents the authority to raise the child as
the parents see fit, except when the state thinks another choice
would be better, is to give the parents no authority at all. If
there is no delegation of authority, there is no barrier
between
1 36
the state and how parents raise their children.
A second approach to the parental autonomy rights arguments is to
acknowledge such rights, but to dismiss them by characterizing
grandparent visitation as a minimal intrusion which does not "unduly
burden" the constitutional rights of parents.13' This undue burden standard,
as applied to grandparent visitation statutes, has been met with sound
criticism.'38 The undue burden standard was first introduced by Justice
O'Connor in the context of abortion regulations in
39 her dissent in City of
Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health.
In Akron, O'Connor explained that "[tihe 'undue burden' required in
the abortion cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must be
conducted before this Court can require a State to justify its legislative
actions under the exacting 'compelling state interest' standard."'" Some
legal scholars say that the language in Akron calls for a "two-tiered"
approach where a court first decides the degree of burden a statute creates
and then, based on that first decision, decides what level of scrutiny to
apply. 4 ' The framework for identifying infringement focuses entirely on
the effect of the state action 4 2 and the degree of burden determines the
level of scrutiny applied: either a court decides that the burden is
sufficiently severe or substantial and applies strict scrutiny, or a court

135. David DeGroot, The Liberal Tradition and the Constitution: Developing a Coherent
Jurisprudenceof ParentalRights, 78 TX. L. REV. 1287, 1318 (2000).

136. Bean, supra note 32, at441.
137. Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203,208-09 (Mo. 1993).
138. See, e.g., Joan C. Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysis of
SelectedGrandparentVisitation Cases,49 OKLA. L. REV. 29,62-65 (1996). See also supra notes

101-22 and accompanying text.
139. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
140. Id. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 867, 893 (1994).

142. Id. at 884-85.
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decides that the
law does not impose an undue burden and applies rational
43
basis review. 1
Examples abound of cases where state courts have used this two-tiered
undue burden standard to find grandparent visitation statutes
constitutional. 1" For instance, in Campbell v. Campbell,145 the Utah
Supreme Court said:
It is not unreasonable for our Legislature to attempt to
strengthen intergenerational ties as an alternative or
supplementary source of family support for children.
Therefore, we conclude that, because grandparent visitation
as provided by section 30-5-2 is rationally related to
promoting the State's legitimate interest in fostering
relationships between grandparents and their grandchildren,
the statute is constitutional. And because grandparent
visitation, as provided by section 30-5-2, does not unduly
burden a parent's autonomous right to raise his or her
children, we do not apply strict scrutiny to determine the
statute's constitutionality. Instead, we hold the statute to be
constitutional because it is rationally related to furthering a
legitimate state interest.146
The undue burden analysis is again seen in Graville v. Dodge,147 where
the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld Arizona's grandparent visitation
statute.14'The court said that "[b]ecause the statute neither substantially
interferes with nor heavily burdens parental rights, we determine whether
it passes constitutional muster [under a rational basis analysis]." 149 The
court held that the statute was "rationally related to furthering the state's
legitimate interest in enabling children to become responsible adults by
fostering relationships between grandchildren and their grandparents," and
therefore the statute was constitutional. 50
The Akron undue burden test appears to have been modified by the
joint, plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in
PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvaniav. Casey."' In Casey,

143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ind.Ct. App. 1997); Reinhardt v.
Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80-81 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478,482 (N.H.
1985); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13, 14-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
145. 896 P.2d 635 (Utah 1995).
146. Id. at 643-44.
147. 985 P.2d 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).

148. Id. at 606.
149. Id. at 610.
150. Id.at 611.

151. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

the joint, plurality opinion utilized the undue burden test as a standard of
review unto itself, as opposed to a threshold inquiry to determine the
appropriate standard of review to apply.152 The plurality repeatedly
that do not
suggested that unduly burdensome laws are
5 3invalid while laws
impose undue burdens are constitutional.
This second approach to applying the undue burden test has also been
used in deciding the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes., 54
The problem with this approach in the context of grandparent visitation is
that courts are left with a great amount of discretion to make a value
judgement as to how burdensome a statute is. Therefore, a highly
sentimental court is unlikely to find that a statute is unduly burdensome.
The ease with which a court can find a grandparent visitation statute
constitutional based more on sentiment than on sound legal principles is
evidenced by the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in King v. King. 5'
In King, the parents and grandchild lived with the grandfather on the
'
grandfather's farm. 56 The father worked for the grandfather on this farm. 57
After sixteen months in this arrangement, the grandfather asked his son,
daughter-in-law, and granddaughter to move out of the house on the farm
because the grandfather thought his son drank too much and did not work
enough."5 8
Although the grandfather saw his granddaughter almost every day for
those sixteen months when she lived on the farm, after she and her parents
moved, the parents refused to allow the grandfather to see his
granddaughter." 9 The grandfather petitioned for visitation under the
Kentucky grandparent visitation statute, which provided: "The circuit court
may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal
grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree
if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so."'' 6
The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and found
visitation to be in the grandchild's best interest. 6 ' The court of appeals did
not reach the constitutional issue because it reversed on the issue of the

152. See id. at 876-79.
153. See id.at 877 ("In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional
burden."); id. at 895 (describing the effect of the spousal notice requirement and concluding that
"it is an undue burden, and therefore invalid").
154. See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992); Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d
203, 210 (Mo. 1993).
155. 828 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1992).
156. Id. at 630.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at630-31.
160. Id. at 631.
161. Id.
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best interest of the child. 62 The Kentucky Supreme Court then granted
discretionary review.16 3 The parents urged that the grandparent visitation
statute violated their parental autonomy rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.16' While the court
acknowledged a parent's fundamental right to rear children without undue
governmental interference, the court noted that this right is not inviolate. 16
The court then ruled:
That grandparents and grandchildren normally have a
special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from contact
with the other. The child can learn respect, a sense of
responsibility and love. The grandparent can be invigorated
by exposure to youth, can gain an insight into our changing
society, and can avoid the loneliness which is so often a part
of an aging parent's life. These considerations by the state do
not go too far in intruding into the fundamental rights of the
166
parents. Thus, we find that KRS 405.021 is constitutional.
The court further justified its ruling because the statute provided
procedural protections, such as requiring that the action be filed in circuit
court and that petitioner receive a hearing before a judge. 67 This latter
justification is weak at best.
The King court concluded that the statute was not unduly burdensome
or intrusive, a one step process.' Clearly, there is a danger in a one-step
approach to the undue burden test: sentiment rules. Studies show that
grandchildren often do not benefit from visitation with grandparents, that
ordered visitation is traumatic for the child and destructive for the parents'
marriage, and that visitation cases destroy relationships and
pocketbooks.' 69 Yet the King majority falls to acknowledge the negative

162. Id.

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 632.
167. Id.
168. Id.

169. "Although many grandparent visitation suits may be grounded in an unselfish interest in
grandchildren, a disturbing number of cases and commentators refer to grandparent visitation suits
as veiled attempts to control or punish the grandparent's adult child, and note their deleterious
effect on the parent-grandparent relationship as well as on the child." Bohl, supra note 138, at 80
n.289; see also Bostock, supra note 13, at 360 (citing Andre P. Derdeyn, GrandparentVisitation
Rights: Rendering Family Dissension More Pronounced?, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 277
(1985); Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic
Alternative, 75 GEO. L. 1745, 1780 (1987) (noting that judicial intrusion in the family unit is an
inevitable source of trauma for the child); Ross A. Thompson et al., Grandparents' Visitation
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aspects which could exist in the context of grandparental visitation, instead
choosing to focus only on a stereotypical picture of intergenerational
harmony. 70 The decision was based on sentiment, on the sad plight of a
grandparent who lived alone and missed his granddaughter, rather than on
legal principles.
This one-step approach to the undue burden test was repeated by the
Missouri Supreme Court in Herndon v. Tuhey.' The facts of Herndonare
nearly identical to those in King: the parents and grandchild lived on the
grandparents' farm, the father worked for the grandfather until there was
a falling out; the parents and grandchild then moved from the farm and the
parents decided to deny the grandparents visitation privileges. 72 The
grandparents then sued for visitation under the Missouri grandparent
visitation statute. 73 The case was appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court,
where the parents argued a violation of their parental autonomy rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 74
In reaching its decision, the Herndoncourt quoted the aforementioned
passage from the King opinion and followed that same sentimental line of
reasoning.17 The Herdon court found that the Missouri statute is "less
than a substantial encroachment on a family" and "only a minimal
intrusion on the family relationship," hence it was constitutional.'

Rights: Legalizing the Ties that Bind, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1222 (1989)).
170." King, 828 S.W.2d at 632.
171. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
172. Id. at 205-06.
173. Id. at 206-07. The relevant part of section 452.402 of Missouri Revised Statutes read:
1.The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents of the child
and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree. The court may grant
grandparent visitation when:

(3) A grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a
period exceeding ninety days.

2. The court shall determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be in the
child's best interest or if it would endanger the child's physical health or impair
his emotional development. Visitation may only be ordered when the court finds

such visitation to be in the best interest of the child. The court may order
reasonable conditions or restrictions on grandparent visitation.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1993).
174. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 206-07.
175. Id. at209-10.
176. Id.
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Criticism of either form of the undue burden test is not hard to find. The
sharpest criticism of the undue burden standard is evident in Justice
Scalia's dissent in Casey where he criticized the standard as a "unique
concept created specially for these cases, to preserve some judicial
foothold in this ill-gotten territory."'" Arguably, Scalia meant that the
undue burden standard was created within the context of abortion; hence
it is possible to argue that the undue burden test should apply only in the
context of abortion. However, case law exists in subject areas other than
abortion which can be interpreted to use the undue burden standard, case
law.which deals with topics such as the rights to marry, free exercise rights
and establishment clause rights, takings, contract impairments, and
deprivations without procedural due process. 7 ' Critics point to these cases,
arguing that current fundamental rights case law employs a wide range of
methodologies of judicial review which vary depending on the nature of
the right at issue. 7 9
Other critics charge that the undue burden standard is not the
appropriate standard of review for grandparent visitation cases, arguing
instead for the use of strict scrutiny.8 I This line of criticism goes on to say
that even if the undue burden standard were appropriate, it would still be
difficult to argue that forcing parents to allow a grandparent into their
home or to deliver their children to a grandparent for visitation, be it for a
day or an hour, is not a "significant intrusion."'' Despite criticism, courts
continue to use the undue burden standard to uphold grandparent visitation
statutes as constitutional' 8 2
The rationale for using strict scrutiny is most clearly depicted in the
dissent written by Chief Justice Covington of the Missouri Supreme Court
in Herndon.' In her dissent, Chief Justice Covington determined that,
since the child-rearing right is fundamental and restrictions on fundamental
rights should receive strict scrutiny analysis, the proper level of review to

177. Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,988 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
178. Brownstein, supra note 141, at 895-909.
179. Id. at 876.
180. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 138, at 62-67.
181. Id. at 67. But cases such as King and Herndon stand for the idea that grandparent
visitation statutes do not constitute an undue burden. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky.
1992) ('These considerations by the state do not go too far in intruding into the fundamental rights
of the parents. Thus, we find that (the statute] is constitutional."); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209
(The visitation the court approved was "less than a substantial encroachment on a family," hence

it was constitutional.).
182. Only one grandparent visitation case has used undue burden analysis and found the
statute to be unconstitutional. See Hampton v. Hampton, 17 S.W.3d 599, 602-06 (Mo. Ct. App.

2000).
183. 857 S.W.2d 203,211-12 (Mo. 1993) (Covington, J., dissenting).
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apply was not an undue burden standard, but strict scrutiny.8' Only a
compelling government interest can justify government intrusion on a
fundamental right.'85 If an interest is found to be compelling, then the state
must use narrowly tailored means so that only those situations requiring
protection are included." 6 Chief Justice Covington noted that, generally,
some showing of harm to the child is required in order for the state to show
a compelling interest. 87 In both dissents in King, Justices Lambert and
Wintersheimer also advocated that, absent a showing of harm to the child,
the state has no compelling reason to intervene.'88 A call for the application
of strict scrutiny analysis is not always limited to dissenting opinions; in
multiple cases the majority has applied strict scrutiny.
With one exception, courts which invalidate visitation statutes on
constitutional
grounds do so by applying strict scrutiny, either expressly or
189
implicitly.
For instance, in Hawk v. Hawk,"g' the Tennessee Supreme Court found
the Tennessee grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional based on an
implicit strict scrutiny review."9 The Hawk facts are similar to those in
Herndon; the father of the child was employed by the grandfather, the
grandfather fired the father, and when the parents refused to allow
visitation, the grandparents sued."9 The Tennessee statute allowed a court
to order "reasonable visitation" with grandparents if it was "in the best
interests of the minor child."' 93 The Hawk court made its ruling based
entirely on the right to privacy guaranteed in Tennessee's state
constitution. 9 4 The court cited several United States Supreme Court

184.
185.
625, 638
186.
187.

Id.at211-12.
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due ProcessAnalysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV.
(1992).
Id.
Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Covington, J, dissenting) ("Generally, some showing of

harm to the child is required.").
188. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting) ("Absent a
showing of harm to the child, there is no compelling state interest in intervention into the affairs
of an autonomous family and any statute which authorizes such intervention violates the parents'

liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."); id.at 637 (Wintersheimer, ., dissenting) ("Any
interference upon the fundamental right of the parents must pass the constitutional test of harm to
the child to support a compelling governmental interest which would permit such interference.").
189. Bohl, supra note 138, at 34-35. But see Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1151

(Wyoming 1995) (finding the Wyoming grandparent visitation law constitutional under a strict
scrutiny analysis).
190. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).

191. Id.at 577.
192. Id. at 576.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 577 ("This result relieves us of the necessity of addressing the constitutionality of
the statute under the Federal Constitution and, accordingly, we pretermit this issue.").
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cases' 9 5 before declaring that Tennessee's historically strong protection of
parental rights, coupled with the reasoning of federal constitutional cases,
convinced it that the right of parents to care for their children without
unwarranted state intervention is part of the right to privacy embedded in
the liberty interest guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution.'9 6

The Hawk court implicitly applied a strict scrutiny standard when it
stated: "when no substantial harm threatens a child's welfare, the state
lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the
fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit."'"
Hence, the "best interest" of the child does not constitute a compelling
interest and, because the statute did not call for a threshold finding of
harm, the statute was found unconstitutional.198 However, the court limited
its decision by examining only the "constitutionality of the statute as it
applies to marriedparents whosefitness is unchallenged."'99
Two years later, in 1995, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled in Brooks
v. Parkerson, that the Georgia grandparent visitation statute was
unconstitutional based on both state and federal constitutional grounds,
using an implicit strict scrutiny analysis.Y°" The Georgia statute provided
that "the court may grant any grandparent of the child reasonable visitation
rights upon proof of special circumstances which make such visitation
rights necessary to the best interest of the child."' The Georgia Supreme
Court followed the logic of the Tennessee Supreme Court, citing the same
United States Supreme Court cases as the court in Hawk. Combining that
reasoning with Georgia cases and Georgia statutory and constitutional law,
the court arrived at the conclusion that "state interference with parental
rights to custody and control of children is permissible only where the
health or welfare of a child is threatened."' °3

195. Id. at 578-79 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 534-35 (1977);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
196.. Id. at 578. The court said that, "although this Court has not previously determined that
the state constitution protects a parent's right to rear a child, the right has long been protected from
state interference, except where the child's welfare is 'materially jeopardized."' Id. But, the court

nonetheless found parental rights to be a fundamental right under the state constitution:
"Tennessee's historically strong protection of parental rights and the reasoning of federal

constitutional cases convince us that parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest under
Article 1, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution." Id. at 579.
197. Id. at 577.
198. Id. at 582.

199. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
200. 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).

201. Id. at 774.
202. Id. at 771.
203. Id. at 773.
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The Brooks court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional under both
the Georgia and United States constitutions. The court ruled that the statute
failed to pass constitutional muster on two grounds. First, the court felt that
the statute did not clearly promote the health or welfare of the child. 2°4 The
court cited several studies supporting the idea that grandparent visitation
with grandchildren does not always promote the child's health or
welfare. 5 The court also based its ruling on the fact that the statute did not
require a showing of harm before state interference was authorized. 2' 6
In 1999, the North Dakota Supreme Court found its grandparent
visitation statute unconstitutional, under both its state constitution and the
United States Constitution. 7 The court in Hoff v. Berg explicitly applied
strict scrutiny in its analysis of the North Dakota grandparent visitation
statute." 8 The statute in question provided, in part, that

[t]he grandparents of an unmarried minor must be granted
reasonable visitation rights ...to the minor... by the district
court upon application by the grandparents ...unless a
finding is made that visitation is not in the best interests of the
minor. Visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried
minor are presumed to be in the best interests of the minor.2" 9
The court held that the state did not meet its burden of showing a
"compelling interest in presuming visitation rights of grandparents to an
unmarried minor are in the child's best interests and forcing parents to
accede to court-ordered.., visitation unless the parents are first able to
prove such visitation is not in the best interests of their minor child." 2 0 The
court deemed the statute unconstitutional because it violated parents'
fundamental liberty interests in controlling persons with whom their
children may associate, which is protected by the due process clauses of
both the state and Federal Constitutions.11 However, the court did state
2 12
that a more narrowly tailored statute might pass constitutional muster.

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 774.
207. Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285,292 (N.D. 1999).
208. 595 N.W.2d 285, 291 (N.D. 1999) ("Thus, we employ strict scrutiny when analyzing

statutory intrusions on parents' fundamental right to control their children's associations.").
209. Id. at 287.
210. Id. at 291.
211. Id. at 291-92.
212. Id. at 291 ("Methods to promote grandparental visitation can be more narrowly tailored
and still reasonably accomplish the legislative purpose behind N.D.C.C. §§ (sic] 14-09-05.1.").
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A Wyoming case, Michael v. Hertzler,2 "3 is the anomaly to the
application of strict scrutiny. In that case, the Wyoming Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of the Wyoming grandparent visitation
statute. 4 Susan and Chris Michael sought an order of visitation with their
grandchildren against the children's adoptive father, Dean Hertzler. 2' 5 The
trial court ruled that the Wyoming statute gave the grandparents standing
to petition the court for visitation rights, but that the statute was
"unconstitutional under the due process requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because,
without a preliminary finding of harm to the children, or unfitness of the
parent, the State does not have a compelling interest in ordering
visitation. ' '2 6 Hence, the trial court followed the reasoning of the
Tennessee, Georgia, and North Dakota courts.217

213. 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995).
214. Section 20-7-101 of Wyoming Statutes provides:
(a) A grandparent may bring an original action against any person having
custody of the grandparent's minor grandchild to establish reasonable visitation
rights to the child if:
(i) The grandparent's child who is the parent of the minor grandchild has died
or has divorced the minor grandchild's other parent and the person having custody
ofthe minor grandchild has refused reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent;
or

(ii) An unmarried minor grandchild has resided with the grandparent for a
period in excess of six (6) consecutive months before being returned to the
custody of the minor grandchild's parents and the parents have refused reasonable
visitation rights to the grandparent.
(b) In any action or proceeding under subsection (a) of this section, the court
may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent of a child if the court
finds, after a hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and
that the rights of the child's parents are not substantially impaired.
(c) No action to establish visitation rights may be brought by a grandparent
under subsection (a) of this section if the minor grandchild has been adopted and
neither adopting parent is a natural parent of the child.
(d)In any action or proceeding in which visitation rights have been granted
to a grandparent under this section, the court may for good cause upon petition of
the person having custody or who is the guardian of the child, revoke or amend
the visitation rights granted to the grandparent.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1993).
215. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1145.
216. Id. at 1146.
217. See supra notes 190-212 and accompanying text.
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The Michael court explicitly applied strict scrutiny"1 8 because the case
involved a parent's fundamental right to raise his children 219 and because
the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the "right to associate with one's
family" as a fundamental right under the Wyoming constitution. 220 The
Wyoming Supreme Court moreover recognized that Hertzler's right to
raise his children is also a right guaranteed in the Wyoming constitution.22
However, the court noted that while the interest of a parent is a
fundamental liberty interest, this interest is not without its limitations.2 22
After quoting sentimental language from King,223 a New York Court of
Appeals case,22 and a law journal article, 225 the Michael court determined
that there is a compelling state interest in Wyoming "which justifies the
grandparent visitation statute. 226 The court found that the "best interest of
the child" standard, which the statute expressly calls for, represents a
compelling state interest in the state's role as parens patriae. 227 This
proposition is what makes Michaelthe "red-headed stepchild" of cases that
apply strict scrutiny. Michaelstands in direct opposition to the requirement
set forth by the Tennessee, Georgia, and North Dakota Supreme Courts,
the requirement of a showing of harm before the best interest standard can
even be applied. 28 The Wyoming Supreme Court also found a compelling
state interest in maintaining the right of association between grandparents
and grandchildren. 229 Because the court found a compelling state interest

218. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1147 ("We hold the strict scrutiny test must be applied in this

instance.").
219. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
220. Id. at 1150.
221. See id. at 1147 ("Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6... provides, '[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.').
222. Id.at 1148.
223. Id.at 1149 (quotingKing v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992)) ("That grandparents
and grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from contact with

the other.').
224. Id. at 1149 ("Urhe statute in question] rests on the humanitarian concern that '[v]isits with
a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve
upon the grandchild which he cannot derive from any other relationship."') (quoting Matter of
Ehrlich v. Ressner, 391 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)).
225. Id. at 1151 (citing Patricia S.Fernandez, GrandparentAccess: A Model Statute,6 YALE
L. & POL'YREV. 109,109-10 (1988)).
226. Id. at 1149.

227. l
228. See supra notes 190-212 and accompanying text.
229. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1151.
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and found that the statute was narrowly drawn,23 the Wyoming
grandparent visitation statute survived strict scrutiny.23'
With the exception of Michael, the use of strict scrutiny analysis has
signaled the death knell for the grandparent visitation statutes of many
states. However, strict scrutiny has rarely been applied in grandparent
visitation cases. The number of courts finding grandparent visitation
statutes constitutional dramatically outnumber those finding these statutes
unconstitutional.232 Even in cases finding the statutes unconstitutional,
those courts do not completely close the door to amended versions of
grandparent visitation statutes. Instead, they make narrow rulings, like the
Hawk233 arid Troxe234 courts, or indicate a willingness to approve more
narrowly tailored statutes, like the Hof-f35 court. Courts holding
grandparent visitation statutes unconstitutional have not foreclosed the
possibility of a statutorily defined right to grandparent visitation, but they
have narrowed the path to those rights.

230. Id. ("We are satisfied this statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn. Only a grandparent is
afforded the opportunity to file for visitation. The circumstances are limited to an instance in which
the grandparent's child, who is the parent, has died or has divorced the other parent, and the person
having custody has refused reasonable visitation; or an instance in which an unmarried minor
grandchild has resided with the grandparent for more than six months before being returned to the
custody of the grandchild's parents, and those parents have refused reasonable visitation rights. We
understand weighing of the fundamental interests of the parents, grandparents, and children is not
an easy task. It will be a difficult decision in many instances, but the standard incorporated in the
statute, the best interest of the child, is well recognized, and the court clearly can control those
rights so the rights of the parents will not be substantially impaired.").
231. Id ("We hold the statute is constitutional.").
232. See In re Graville, 985 P.2d 604, 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) ("In so holding, we are in
agreement with the majority of the courts in the nation that have upheld similar grandparent
visitation statutes."); Ridenour v. Ridenour, 901 P.2d 770,774 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("A majority
of courts which have considered this issue have rejected similar or related constitutional
challenges."). Courts in the following cases have upheld grandparental visitation statutes in the face
of constitutional challenges: Cockrell v. Sittason, 500 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986);
Graville, 985 P.2d at 611; Sanchez v. Parker, No.93-09822, 1995 WL 489146, at *1-*2 (Del. Faro.
Ct. July 1, 1995); West v. West, 689 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (IlI. App. Ct. 1998); Sightes v. Barker, 684
N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ind.Ct. App. 1997); Spradling v. Harris, 778 P.2d 365, 368 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630,632 (Ky. 1992); Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912,915 (Miss.
1997); Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203,208 (Mo. 1993); Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478,481
(N.H. 1985); R.T. v I.E., 650 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. Super CL Ch. Div. 1994); Ridenour, 901 P.2d at
774; Sibley v. Shephard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 1981); Hedrick v. Hedrick, 368 S.E.2d 14,
18-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 516 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986); Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522,526 (Tex. App. 1975); Campbell v. Campbell,
896 P.2d 635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Michael, 900 P.2d at 1151.
233. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,577 (Tenn. 1993).
234. Troxel v. Graville, 120 S.Ct. 2054,2061 (2000).
235. Hoffv. Hoff, 595 N.W.2d 285,291-92 (N.D. 1999).
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V. THE FLORIDA GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES: THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE'S ATrEMFIrS TO CREATE A "LEGISLATIVE SLEIGH" TO
CARRY THE CHILDREN THROUGH THE WIDE AND DRIFTING LAW

Florida legislators have had a poor record in creating a grandparent
visitation statute that passes the Florida Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis. Before 1978, Florida did not provide grandparents any statutory
basis upon which they could seek visitation with their grandchildren.236 To
remedy the situation, in 1978, the Florida Legislature addressed
grandparent visitation rights in two ways. First, the legislature amended
section 61.13(2)(b) of Florida Statutes to allow a court to award visitation
as part of a marriage dissolution proceeding.2 7 This amendment did not do
much to further the grandparent visitation cause because grandparents were
not given legal standing to appear or intervene and were not required to be
made parties to the dissolution proceeding.238 Grandparents seeking
visitation while the child's natural parents' marriage was still intact or even
during a divorce proceeding of the natural parents generally lost on issues
of standing. 239 Because the statute did not otherwise confer standing on
grandparents, they could only be awarded visitation during a proceeding
initiated by one of the parents, or if the trial judge granted an award sua
sponte.24 The Florida legislature also tried to help grandparents by
enacting section 68.08 of Florida Statutes in 1978, which gave courts the

236. Before 1978, the case law in Florida dictated that an order was "unjustified" and
"unenforceable" if it granted visitation rights to a nonparent of a child whose custody had been
awarded to a fit parent. Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So. 2d 12, 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
237. The relevant language read:
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if it is
deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or given notice of
dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grandparents have legal
standing as "contestants" as defined in s. 61.1306.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (1978).
238. See Elizabeth Belsom, Note, GrandparentVisitation:A FloridaFocus,41 FLA. L. REv.
179, 183 (1989) (citing Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (stating that
grandparents had no standing to petition for visitation, even during the course of divorce
proceeding)); see also Osteryoung v. Leibowitz, 371 So. 2d 1068, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
(showing that there is no independent grant of standing to grandparents for visitation absent
dissolution proceeding).
239. Belsom, supra note 238, at 183-84.
240. Id. at 185-86. The note discusses Putnalv. Putnal,392 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981),
in which the trial court ordered grandparent visitation pursuant to a modification proceeding
initiated by the father. Id. at 615. Because one of the contestants, rather than the grandparents,
initiated the action, the case presented no standing problems. Id.
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ability to grant visitation awards to grandparents upon the death of or
desertion by one of the child's parents.24'
The 1978 statutes actually did little to help grandparents who sought
visitation. For example, in Shuler v. Shuler,242 the First District Court of
Appeal strictly construed the standing requirements for grandparents
seeking visitation after the divorce of the grandchild's parents. 43 In Shuler,
the paternal grandparents won two monthly visits after petitioning the trial
court to modify a custody award to the mother.2' The mother appealed and
the First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the grandparents
had no standing to bring their own petition for modification as they were
not "contestants" to the proceeding under section 61.13 (2)(b). 45 The court
found that the grandparents24 could not, by themselves, become parties to the
modification proceeding. 6
That same year, in Osteryoung v. Leibowitz,247 the Third District Court

of Appeal held that grandparents could not bring their own action for
visitation rights if there was no divorce action pending.248 In Osteryoung,
the grandparents petitioned for visitation rights after their son and
daughter-in-law refused to let them see their grandchild. 249 The court held
that because there was no divorce action pending between the parents, the
grandparents
did not have standing; hence, section 61.13(b)(2) did not
0
apply.2
As Shuler and Osteryoung demonstrated, grandparents seeking
visitation under section 61.13(b)(2) faced tremendous procedural obstacles.
Since they could not bring independent visitation actions, grandparents
were put in a difficult position if they wanted to pursue visitation. Since
courts were not required to make grandparents parties, nor notify them of
a divorce proceeding, grandparents could only act once a divorce
241. The statute reads:
Any court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters shall
have jurisdiction to award the grandparents of a minor child or minor children
visitation rights of the minor child or children upon the death of or desertion by
one of the minor child's parents if it is deemed by the court to be in the minor
child's best interest.
FLA. STAT. § 68.08 (1978).
242. 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
243. Id. at 590.
244. Id. at 588.
245. Id. at 590.
246. Id. at 589.
247. 371 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
248. Id. at 1069.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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proceeding was pending in court." The force and effect of this statute was
to make grandparents get involved in their childrens' divorces if they
wanted visitation with their grandchildren after the divorce." 2
In 1984, the Florida Legislature sought to help grandparents by
consolidating the two separate grandparent visitation provisions into
chapter 752 of the Florida Statutes, titled "Grandparent Visitation
Rights. ' ' 3 This statute gave grandparents the right to seek visitation on
their own when it was in the best interest of the child if: "(a) [o]ne or both
parents of the child are deceased,25' (b) [t]he marriage of the child's parents
has been dissolved,255 or (c) [a] parent of the child has deserted the
child." 2 6 The legislature limited the chapter by refusing to extend its scope
to adoption situations unless the adoption is by a stepparent.
In 1990, the legislature overhauled the grandparent visitation statute.
Among the changes was the addition of guidelines to the statute to help
courts determine when visitation is in the best interest of the child. 258 Of
the factors to be considered according to the statute, case law has shown
that the length and quality of the prior relationship between the grandparent
and grandchild is the most significant criterion for Florida courts."
The legislature also added language which had the effect of making an
award of visitation mandatory upon a finding that it was in the best interest
of the child, as opposed to the former discretionary language.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See Belsom, supra note 238, at 185.
See id.
FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1984).
Id. § 752.01(1)(a).

255. Id. § 752.01(l)(b).
256. Id. § 752.01(1)(c).
257. Id. § 752.01(2).
258. Id. The criteria are as follows:
(a) The willingness of the grandparent or grandparents to encourage a close
relationship between the child and the parent or parents.
(b) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the
grandparent or grandparents.
(c) The preference of the child if the child is determined to be of sufficient
maturity to express a preference.
(d) The mental and physical health of the child.
(e) The mental and physical health of the grandparent or grandparents.
(f Such other factors as are necessary in the particular circumstances.

Id.
259. See Michael J. Minerva, GrandparentVisitation:The ParentalPrivacy Right to Raise
Their "Bundle of Joy," 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 537 (1991).
260. The earlier statute provided that ajudge "may... award reasonable rights of visitation"
upon a finding of the child's best interests. FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1984). Hence, a judge could
theoretically refuse to award visitation even if he or she determined it to be in the child's best
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Additionally, the legislature added a new section to encourage internal, as
opposed to court-ordered, resolution of family differences. The section
requires courts to refer newly-filed petitions for visitation to mediation
services, if such services are available in a given circuit, in cases where
families cannot internally resolve their differences. 6 Furthermore, the
legislature created a new ground on which grandparents could seek
visitation: that is, when a child is "born out of wedlock and not later
determined to be a child born within wedlock as provided in s. 742.091 .',262
The statute was amended again in 1993 to add another basis for
grandparents to petition for visitation. Section 752.01(1)(e) of Florida
Statutes grants standing for grandparents to seek visitation even though the
family of the grandchild is still intact without a requirement of a divorce
proceeding or parental death or desertion.263
The latest amendment of Florida's grandparent visitation statute was
enacted in May 2000.264 The revised statute was made necessary by a string
of Florida Supreme Court cases, discussed below, which declared various
parts of the former statute unconstitutional. 265 The newest version of the
statute allows grandparents to petition for visitation rights when: "(a) [t]he
marriage of the parents of the child has been dissolved;66 (b) (a] parent of
the child has deserted the child;267 or (c) the child was born out of wedlock
and not later determined to be a child born within wedlock as provided in
s. 742.09 1.",268 However, as the following sections will show, this statute
too will need to be amended in accordance with Florida Supreme Court
decisions.
VI. THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION'S PRIVACY PROVISION: THE
"LEGISLATIVE SLEIGH" FINDS A ROADBLOCK

The concept of a personal right to privacy originated in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 1923, in Meyer v.
Nebraska,269 the United States Supreme Court concluded that the liberty
interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included the right to
interest. However, "common sense suggests, and case law supports, that no judge would choose to

refuse a visitation award if it was found to be in the child's best interest." Minerva, supranote 259,
at 536. Hence, the change in language, from "may" to "shall" seems to do little more than conform
the statute to existing practice. FLA.STAT. § 752.01(1) (1990).
261. PA. STAT. § 752.015 (1990).
262. Id.§ 752.01(1)(d).
263. FLA.STAT. § 752.01(1)(e) (1993).
264. FLA.STAT. § 752.01; see also H.B. 1059, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000).
265. See infra notes 288-403 and accompanying text.
266. FLA.STAT. § 752.01(a).
267. Id. § 752.01(b).
268. Id. § 752.01(c).
269. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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establish a home and bring up children. 270 Two years later, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,"7 the Supreme Court recognized "the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control" as a fundamental right.272 Years later, the Court explained
that "[a]lthough 'It]he Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of
privacy,' the Court has recognized that one aspect of the 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a 'right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy."' 273
A series of Supreme Court cases has since upheld the right of parents to
raise their children without undue government interventionY
A similar, yet stronger, right of privacy is protected by the Florida
ConstitutionY 5 No discussion of the path of the Florida grandparent
visitation statute is complete without discussing article I, section 23 of the

270. Id. at 399 (holding that a state law prohibiting the teaching in schools of any modem
language other than English was unconstitutional). The liberty guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment denotes freedom "to engagein any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up children. .. ." Id.
271. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
272. Id. at 534-35.
273. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
274. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating that the Due
Process Clause "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests," including the right "to direct the education and upbringing
of one's children"); M.L.B. vi S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) ("Choices about marriage, family
life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights ...sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982) (acknowledging that natural parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody and management of their children); Lassiter v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (Absent-a powerful countervailing interest, "a parent's desire for and right to
'the companionship, care, custody, and management oghis or her children' is an important interest
that undeniably warrants deference and.., protection."); Parham v. I.R., 442 U.S. 584,,602 (1979)
("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit
with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that
course."); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) ('The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,533 (1953) (A mother's right to
care for minor children "more precous... than property rights."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (deeming the right to raise one's
children essential); Skinner v. Oklahoma,. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (counting marriage and
procreation among the "basic civil rights of man").
275. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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Florida Constitution, the privacy provision. Florida's privacy provision
reads as follows: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by
law. 276 This Florida privacy provision creates an explicit right to privacy
within the Florida Constitution, rather than one created by judicial
interpretation, as is the case with privacy rights under the Federal
Constitution.
The Florida Supreme Court held in Winfield v. DivisionofPari-Mutual
Wagering,277 and has reiterated in many cases since then,278 that the Florida
Constitution encompasses all the privacy rights recognized in federal cases
and more. Regarding the strength of Florida's privacy provision, Justice
Adkins wrote:
The drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the words
"unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the phrase
"governmental intrusion" in order to make the privacy right
as strong as possible. Since the people of this state exercised
their prerogative and enacted an amendment to the Florida
Constitution which expressly and succinctly provides for a
strong right of privacy not found in the United States
Constitution, it can only be concluded that the right is much
broader in scope than that of the Federal Constitution.279
Yet, however strong this right to privacy may be in Florida, it does not
apply in all situations where the state regulates limits on personal choice.
"[B]efore the right of privacy is attached and the delineated standard
applied, a reasonable expectation of privacy must exist."280 The issue of
whether a parent has a reasonable expectation that he or she can raise a
child without the state intervening and awarding visitation rights to a
grandparent has not been directly addressed by any court, Florida or
federal."' However, cases which have been decided on both the state and
federal level indicate that such an expectation is reasonable. 2n Even if a

276. Id.
277. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
278. See, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
279. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.

280. Id. at 547.
281. See Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
282. See id.; see also State ex rel. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196 (Fla. 1989) (striking down a state
statute that would require a minor seeking an abortion to get permission from her parents before the
procedure because the statute was violative of the privacy provision in the Florida Constitution);
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parent can prove a reasonable expectation of privacy, the privacy right is
not absolute and "will yield to compelling governmental interests. 283
Because the right of privacy is considered a fundamental right by the
Florida Supreme Court, the compelling state interest test-essentially,
strict scrutiny-applies to cases adjudicated by that court.28 4 "This test
shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy."2
In order to meet the burden, the state must demonstrate that "the
challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes
its goal through the use of the least intrusive means. 2 86 In custody and
visitation cases, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the State can
satisfy the compelling state interest standard when it acts to prevent
demonstrable harm to a child; however, the Florida Supreme Court has
also stated that acting to promote the best interest of the child, absent some
sort of harm if the State does not intervene, does not rise to the level of a
compelling state interest. 2 7
VII. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF FLORIDA' S
GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE IN LIGHT OF FLORIDA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROVISION: HOW THE FLORIDA

SUPREME COURT DECIDED THAT THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE DOES NOT KNOW THE WAY TO
CARRY THE SLEIGH THROUGH THE

WIDE AND DRIFTING LAW

The first landmark case interpreting the Florida grandparent visitation
statute was the First District Court of Appeal's 1990 decision in Sketo v.
Brown.2" The case was decided under the 1987 version of the statute,
which allowed courts to "award reasonable rights of visitation to the
grandparent with respect to the child when it is in the best interest of the
minor child" if, among other things, "[o]ne or both parents of the child are
deceased."'2 89 The parents and children in Sketo lived in California and

Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18,20 (Fla. 1957) (The court asserted "that a parent has a natural God
given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship and companionship ofhis offspring. This is a rule
older than the common law itself.") (citation omitted); cases cited supranote 274. Given the broad
rights that Florida recognizes in its own cases and in federal cases, a parent who has neither
abandoned, neglected, nor abused a child should have a reasonable expectation that the state will
not interfere with his or her decision to limit a grandparent's access to the child.
283. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
284. Id.
285. Id.

286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996).
559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Id. at 382 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1987)).
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Washington until the death of the father.2 0 After the father's death, the
mother moved with her two children to Tallahassee, where the paternal
grandmother lived. 29' The grandmother visited with the children on a few
occasions but then the relationship between the grandmother and the
daughter-in-law deteriorated to the point where the grandmother was
allowed only limited visitation with the children. 292 The grandmother
petitioned for more visitation under Florida Statute section 752.01, and the
trial court awarded her extensive visitation rights. 93
The mother appealed the decision, arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and "article I, section 23 of
the Florida Constitution accord to her a right of privacy to raise her
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. at382-83.
Id. at 383.
Id. The pertinent part of the lower court's visitation order read:

The paternal grandmother shall have the right to access and communication with
the minor children including but not limited to visitation unsupervised by the
natural mother or her agent and overnight visits. If the parties cannot agree as to
reasonable visitation time, it shall be ordered as follows:
A. Paternal grandmother shall have the right to exercise visitation with the
minor children every other week from 6:00 P.M. on Friday to 6:00 P.M. on
Saturday. It is the court's intention that this visitation every other week, by
agreement oftheparties, may be rescheduled to accommodate the natural mother's
work schedule....
Beginning on Wednesday, August 2, 1989, and every other Wednesday
thereafter, the paternal grandmother shall have unsupervised visitation a (sic]
place of her choice with the minor children from 6:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M.
B. In addition to the above visitation schedule, the paternal grandmother shall
have visitation with the minor children for one day either before or after the
following holidays and birthdays, to-wit: Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and
each child's birthday. The visitation shall be from 9:00 in the morning until 7:00
P.M. The parties may rearrange said visit to be mutually agreeable to party [sic].
The parties are to take into consideration out of town holiday travel and
accommodate this time. If the parties cannot agree, the visitation shall be the day
before each of the holidays and birthdays.
C. Beginning in 1990 and every year thereafter until the children's age of
maturity, paternal grandmother shall have visitation with the party's minor
children for one week in the summer in addition to the above schedule of
visitation. If the parties cannot agree it will begin at 6:00 P.M. on July Iand end
at 6:00 P.M. on July 8.
During this period of time the mother shall have the right of communication
with the minor children. The paternal grandmother shall have the right to take the
children out of town during this vacation time. The paternal grandmother shall be
responsible for transportation of the minor children for the visitation unless
otherwise agreed to by the parties.
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children 'as she sees fit"' and Florida Statute section 752.01 interfered with
that right.2 94 She further argued that (1) the state can only interfere with her
right to raise her children as she sees fit if there is a compelling state
interest, (2) that even if there was a compelling state interest it "must be
exercised by the least restrictive means," and (3) there is no compelling
interest to make a parent submit her children to compelled visitation with
their grandparents over the parent's wishes.295 The First District Court of
Appeal disagreed, ruling that:
The state has a sufficiently compelling interest in the welfare
of children that it can provide for the continuation of relations
between children and their grandparents under reasonable
terms and conditions so long as that is in the children's
interest. Since that is all the challenged statute purports to do,
it is not facially unconstitutional.'
However, the court did find that the record did not establish such extensive
rights of visitation as those granted by the trial court; the case was reversed
and remanded to the trial court to reconsider the extent of visitation and
"set forth specific findings of fact to show why the visitation being ordered
is in the children's best interest." 297
Although the Florida grandparent visitation statute survived its first
challenge, six years later the Florida Supreme Court would begin to
steadily chip away at the statute. The first blow to the statute came in 1996
in Beagle v. Beagle.298 This decision was the first to attack the 1993
version of the grandparent visitation statute. The effect of the decision was,
and still is, powerful. 299
Beagle involved the 1993 grandparent visitation statute, specifically
section 752.01(l)(e) of Florida Statutes.3" In that case, the paternal

294. Id. at 382.

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 383.
298. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
299. According to a Lexis/Westlaw search done by the author in February 2001, the
unanimous decision has been cited in over 80 grandparent visitation statute cases and 47 journal
articles nationwide. Every subsequent Florida Supreme Court decision which would rule another
part of the Florida grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional would cite to Beagle.
300. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1273. FLA. STAT. § 752.01(l)(e) states that courts shall award
visitation upon a petition of the grandparents, if it is in the best interest of the child, if:

(e) The minor is living with both natural parents who are still married to each
other whether or not there is a broken relationship between either or both parents
of the minor child and the grandparents, and either or both parents have used their
parental authority to prohibit a relationship between the minor child and the
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grandparents of Amber Beagle petitioned for visitation rights. 01 At the
time of the petition, the parents were living together with Amber as an
intact family.3" The trial court found the statute to be facially
unconstitutional, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed, relying
heavily on the reasoning set forth in Sketo."3
The First District Court of Appeal reasoned that an intact family is no
more deserving of privacy protections than a family which is not intact,
and because a single parent could not prevail in a constitutional privacy
argument against the statute, neither could an intact family."0 The court
emphasized that it is the best interest of the child that should concern the
court, not whether the child lives in an intact family or not.305 However,
while acknowledging that the court was bound by its own precedent, Judge
Webster noted in his concurrence that he would prefer that the court recede
from the Sketo decision. °6
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that subsection (1)(e) was
facially unconstitutional. 7 The court outlined case law where courts held
that parents have a fundamental liberfy interest to raise their children
without undue government interference which is protected by both the
State and Federal Constitutions. 08 The court explained that because the
right to privacy is a fundamental right, then intrusion upon that right must
be justified by a compelling state interest. 30,The court went on to hold that,
based on the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution, the State may
not intrude upon parents' fundamental privacy right to raise their children
as they see fit unless the child is threatened with demonstrable harm. 3 0 The
court stated that, while harm or detriment is always an element of a best
interest analysis, the best interest test, absent an explicit requirement of
harm, cannot pass constitutional muster in the specific context of a
decision made by parents in an intact family.31 1 In making this decision, the

grandparents.
FLA. STAT. §

752.01(1)(e).

301. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1273.
302. Id.

303. Id. at 1273-74.
304. Beagle v. Beagle, 654 So. 2d 1260,1263 (Ist DCA), rev'd 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
305. Id.

306. Id. (Webster, J., concurring).
307. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1272.

308. Id. at 1274-75.
309. Id. at 1276.
310. Id. The court stated that the resolution of the issue under the Florida Constitution moots
the federal claim. Id. at 1272.
311. Id. at 1276.
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court quoted the reasoning of the Georgia313Supreme Court in Brooks3 12 and
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hawk.
Although the Florida Supreme Court struck down a portion of the
grandparent visitation statute, it did so in a narrow manner. The court
stressed more than once that the holding was limited to situations where "a
child is living with both natural parents, at least one natural parent objects
to grandparental visitation, and no relevant matters are pending in the court
system. 3 14 The court went on to further emphasize that its decision is not
a comment on the desirability of interaction between grandparents and
their grandchildren. 3 5 The court stressed that the focus of the decision was
solely on whether government interference such as that provided for in the
statute is permissible in the absence of a demonstrable harm to the child.31 6
By making these statements in the first paragraph of the decision, the
Florida Supreme Court made it clear that it did not want to be an ogre, but
it could not base its decision on the sentimentality of the relationships
between grandparents and grandchildren. 317 Further, the court made it clear
that it would not make a sweeping decision to strike down the statute. The
case was decided on very narrow grounds, declaring only the specific
subsection unconstitutional, as if to say that the court sympathized with
grandparents, but the law did not.318
Four months after the Beagle decision, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, in Ward v. Dibble, 19 was given the opportunity to address section
752.0l(l)(a) of Florida Statutes.32 0 In Ward, the mother had passed away
and the children were living with their father when the maternal
grandmother filed a petition for visitation.32' The Fifth District Court of
Appeal vacated the lower court's award of grandparent visitation rights,
finding that the trial judge's conclusion that grandparent visitation was in
the best interests of the children was not supported by any competent
evidence. 22 The court noted that this finding mooted any constitutional

312. Id. at 1276-77 (citing Brooks v. Patterson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995)).
313. Id. (citing Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993)).
314. Id. at 1272.
315. Id.
316. Id. The court also emphasized that its decision was based on the law, rather than emotion,
by stating, "[w]e must refrain fromexpressing our personal thoughts as either grandparents or future
grandparents." Id. at 1277.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. 683 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
320. ML at 668. Skew addressed the 1987 version of the statute, Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d
381, 381-82 (Fla. Ist DCA 1990), while Ward addressed the 1993 version, Ward, 683 So. 2d at
668. The content of the statutes examined by the two courts were, however, identical.
321. Ward, 683 So. 2d at 666-67.
322. Id. at 670.
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issue.3 23 Nonetheless, the constitutional issue remained below the surface
of the court's reasoning, as revealed by multiple footnotes within the
decision.324
In its first substantive footnote, the court acknowledged the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Beagle and went on to say that, from the
standpoint of a parent's right to raise his children, "the distinction between
an intact marriage where one parent objects to visitation and a case where
one parent has died and the surviving parent objects to visitation is hard to
discern." 3 In footnote five, the court cites to Steward v. Steward,326 where
the Nevada Supreme Court construed Nevada's grandparent visitation
statute, which was nearly identical to Florida's, "to embody a presumption
against grandparent visitation when divorced parents with full legal rights
to the children agree" that seeing the grandparents is not in the child's best
interest." Finally, in footnote six, the court predicts that constitutional
challenges to grandparent visitation statutes have "apparently just begun"
and goes on to provide a lengthy overview.32 8 The court's forecast could
not have been more accurate.
An impassioned dissent in Von Eiffv. Azicri329 would lay the foundation
for the true unraveling of the Florida grandparent visitation statute and
demonstrate that the Ward court's prediction was correct. In Von Eiff,
decided only nine months after Ward, the Third District Court of Appeal
examined the same statute that Ward had examined, Florida Statute section
752.01(l)(a), which allowed a grandparent to petition for visitation when
one or both of the parents of the child are deceased. 330 The natural mother
was deceased and the natural father and adoptive mother objected to the
child visiting with her maternal grandparents.33
The Von Eiffmajority upheld the statute, noting that the Beagle holding
was limited to a different subsection of the statute. 332 The Von Eiff court
distinguished the case before it from Beagle by emphasizing that the Von
Eiff family was no longer "intact," having been disrupted by the death of
the biological mother, and further emphasized that the Florida Supreme
Court had invalidated court-ordered grandparent visitation only when it

323. Id.

324. See id.

325. Id. at 667 n.2.
326.
327.
328.
329.
1998).

890 P.2d 777 (Nev. 1995).
Ward, 683 So. 2d at 670 n.2 (quoting Steward, 890 P.2d at 782).
Id. at 670 n.6.
699 So. 2d 772 (3d DCA 1997) (Green, J., dissenting), vacatedby 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla.

330. Id. at 773 (addressing FLA.

STAT.

§ 752.01(1)(a) (1995)).

331. Id.
332. Id. at 774-75.
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was awarded over the objection of the child's natural, married parents. 333
The majority found that "the state has a compelling interest in protecting
children after a parent has died by preserving grandparent visitation that is
in the child's best interests," and that subsection
(1)(a) was "narrowly
34
interest.
compelling
this
promote
to
tailored"
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Green observed, "[t]here is nothing in the
Beagle analysis to suggest that parents who are single, widowed, separated,
or divorced should have less constitutionally protected privacy rights in the
rearing of their children than married parents in the context of an intact
family. '335 This statement would serve as a subtext for grandparent
visitation cases to follow; with these words the Florida Supreme Court's
efforts to neatly tailor a narrow decision in Beagle were challenged. When
the Von Eiff court certified a question regarding the statute's
constitutionality
to the Florida Supreme Court, the real seam-ripping
336
began.
In the meantime, judicial panels in two different district courts of
appeal would hold section 752.01(l)(a) of Florida Statutes facially
unconstitutional under an analysis similar to that set forth in the Von Eiff
dissent. 3 In Fitts v. Poe,338 the Fifth District cited the reasoning of Beagle
and observed, "we are unable to discern any difference between the
fundamental rights of privacy of a natural parent in an intact family and the
fundamental rights of privacy of a widowed parent. ' 339 In Russo v.
Persico, ° the Fourth District likened its decision that court-ordered
grandparent visitation infringed on a widowed father's rights to the Beagle
court's conclusion that court-ordered grandparent visitation infringed on
the rights of married natural parents."' The Russo court declared
subsection (1)(a) unconstitutional because the statute did not call for any
demonstrable harm to the child to be shown prior to a court imposing
grandparental visitation.342
When the Florida Supreme Court granted review for Von Eiff,it put an
end to the controversy over subsection (1)(a) by holding that the subsection
was facially unconstitutional. 343 In this unanimous decision, the court

333. Id. at 775-76.
334. Id. at 773.
335. Id. at 783 (Green, J., dissenting).
336. The Florida Supreme Court granted review at 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
337. These courts included the Fifth District in Fitts v. Poe, 699 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA
1997) and the Fourth District in Russo v. Persico,706 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
338. 699 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
339. Id. at 348-49 (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996)).
340. 706 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
341. Id. at 934.
342. Id
343. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998).
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reaffirmed the crucial role of requiring proof of demonstrable harm to the
child in any grandparent visitation action.3 " The court repeated the
reasoning of Beagle, which stated that only a compelling state interest
could justify a state intrusion on the fundamental right of privacy
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution, and only harm or threat of harm to
the child is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to rise to the level of a
compelling interest.34
The Von Eiffcourt rejected the grandparents' argument that the death
of a parent gives rise to a compelling state interest in the child's welfare,
noting that to permit such an argument "would inappropriately expand the
types of harm to children that have traditionally warranted government
intervention in parental decision-making. ' 346 The court recognized that
there are many ways a parent may choose to deal with the death of a
spouse, and the decision to allow grandparent visitation should be left up
to the surviving parent, absent some demonstrable harm to the child. 347 The
court stated that if a best-interest test alone was the standard, without a
requirement of harm to the child, then the state would be allowed to
"substitute its own views regarding how a child should be raised for those
of the parent" and "involve the judiciary in second-guessing parental
decisions. '34 8
The Florida Supreme Court also took pains in Von Eiffto make it clear
that it was moving away from the narrow grounds on which it based its
decision in Beagle. 49 The court made it clear that, although its decision in
Beagle referred to the fact that the Beagles were an "intact family," the
decision itself rested on the parents' constitutional rights to parental
autonomy.3 s5 The court stated that while his wife was alive, Philip Von Eiff
had a right, under Beagle, to decide with whom his child would have
relationships 51 "[N]othing in the unfortunate circumstance of one
biological parent's death [affects] the surviving parent's right of privacy
in a parenting decision concerning the child's contact with her maternal
grandparents. 35 2 The court then quoted approvingly the Fittscourt, saying,
"we are unable to discern any difference between the fundamental rights
of privacy of a natural parent in an intact family and the fundamental rights

344. Id.
345. Id. at 514-16.
346. Id. at 515.
347. Id. at 516.
348. Id.
349. See id. at 515.
350. Id. ("Although in Beagle we refer to the fact that the Beagles were an 'intact' family, we
based our decision in Beagle on the constitutionally protected privacy rights parents have in the
rearing of their children.").
351. Id.
352. Id.
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of privacy of a widowed parent. 35 3 Furthermore, the court noted that when
the father remarried, the child became part of an "intact family" once
again. 354 Although the creation of an intact family upon remarriage did not
affect the court's decision, the court did note that the fact that a new intact
family was formed illustrated the difficulty of using categories of family
355
status as the basis for justifying government intrusions upon family life.
Finally, in the Von Eiff decision, the Florida Supreme Court
foreshadowed a broader protection of parental autonomy rights and its next
decision, which would strike down yet another subsection of the Florida
grandparent visitation statute.356 Quoting Judge Green's dissent in the
Third Circuit opinion, the Florida Supreme Court said, "it appears to be an
unassailable proposition that otherwise fit parents.. . who have neither
abused, neglected, or abandoned their child, have a reasonable expectation
that the state will not interfere with their decision to exclude or limit the
grandparents' visitation with their child. ' 357 Until this case, the Florida
statute had been attacked in situations where the parents were or currently
are married. 358 This quote from Judge Green, and the Florida Supreme
Court's decision to reprint it, foreshadowed that future decisions would
begin to focus on the fitness of parents and the strength of the protection
afforded to parental privacy rights to make decisions about child rearing as
opposed to the marital status of the parents.
The next subsection of the Florida grandparent visitation statute to fall
would be subsection (1)(d), which allows a court to grant visitation to
grandparents when the minor child is born out of wedlock and not later
determined to be a child born in wedlock.359 Unlike subsection (1)(a),
litigation over subsection (1)(d) was minimal before the Florida Supreme
Court granted review.
The first court to interpret the statute was the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Spence v. StewarP' in February 1998. Spence is different from
the other cases ruling upon the constitutionality of the various subsections
of the grandparent visitation statute because of the timing of the petition
for visitation. In Spence, the mother of the child filed a paternity action
against the father.36' The father answered, seeking an adjudication of the

353. Id. (citing Fitts v. Poe, 699 So. 2d 348, 348-49 (Fla.5th DCA 1997)).
354. ld. at 515-16.
355. Id.
356. See id.
357. Id. at 515 (quoting Azicri v. Von Eiff, 699 So. 2d 772,781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (Green,
J., dissenting)).
358. See supra notes 288-342 and accompanying text.
359. FLA. STAT. § 752.01(1)(d) (1995).
360. 705 So. 2d 996 (Fa.4th DCA 1998).
361. Id.at997.
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rights and duties of the parties, as well as visitation rights for his mother. 62
In addition, the grandmother filed a motion to intervene, seeking visitation
rights with her grandchild.363 The motion did not refer to any specific
statutory subsection. 36 The trial court sua sponte determined that
subsection36(1)(d)
was facially unconstitutional and denied the motion to
5
intervene.
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal made no decision as to
the constitutionality of subsection (1)(d). 366 The court's only reference to
the constitutional issue was to say that the trial court decided the
constitutionality of the subsection without considering that visitation might
be granted under another statute. 367 Hence, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal chose to adhere to the "settled principle of constitutional law that
courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in
which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other
grounds. 368
The importance of the Spence decision lies not in its decision, or lack
of decision, about the constitutionality of subsection (1)(d), but in the door
it left open for grandparents to seek visitation without needing section
752.01 at all. The Spence court reversed and remanded the trial court
decision so that the trial court could consider granting grandparent
visitation rights under section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) of Florida Statutes. 6 9 The
appellate court made this decision based on language from Beagle.370
Specifically, the Spence court quoted the language in Beagle which stated:
We emphasize again that our holding in this case is not
intended to change the law in other areas of family law where
the best interest of the child is utilized to make a judicial
determination. In issuing this decision, we have no intent to
disrupt or modify the current requirements for best interest
balancing in those other areas of family law proceedings.37
The court determined that matters involving visitation and custody in
paternity actions should be based on a best interest of the child standard,

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.

365. Id.
366. See generally id.

367. Id.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975).
Spence, 705 So. 2d at 998-99.
Id. at 997-98.
Id. (quoting Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1277 (Fla. 1996)).
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just as in dissolution proceedings. 37 The court went on to recognize that
section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) of Florida Statutes allows a court to grant
visitation rights to grandparents if the court determines that such visitation
is in the child's best interest. 373 The court then cited to a Florida Supreme
Court case which granted grandparental visitation rights based on the best
interest of the child in a dissolution proceeding, 374 and two district court
cases which granted grandparental visitation in connection with paternity
actions to support its decision.375
Although the Spence court acknowledged that there is a right to familial
privacy protected by the Florida Constitution, the court found that the
privacy right is not violated by granting visitation under a best interest
analysis in all cases.3 76 The court said that when parents are not in
agreement as to the best interest of their child and they bring the matter to
a court to resolve, such as in dissolution, custody, and paternity actions,
then the court determines what is in the child's best interest. 377 The court
was clear that one parent does not have the absolute right to make child
rearing decisions absent agreement by the other parent unless a court
determines that it is in the best interest of the child for sole responsibility
for the child to rest with that parent; there is no right of privacy for one
parent's decision if the other parent does not agree.378
The Fourth District Court of Appeal left the door open for grandparents
to receive visitation rights under a best interest of the child standard, as
opposed to a standard that requires a showing of harm before visitation can
be granted, by saying:

372. Spence, 705 So. 2d at 998. The court began its reasoning by stating that in Brown v. Bray,
the Florida Supreme Court determined that "a child in a [paternity] situation is similarly a ward of
the court as in the case of a child in a dissolution of marriage situation." Id. (quoting Brown v.
Bray, 300 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 1974)). The court went on to say that it interpreted Bray as placing
a determination of custody in a paternity action on the same footing as a determination of custody
in a dissolution of marriage case in Kochinsky v. Moore. Id. (citing Kockinsky v. Moore, 698 So.

2d 397, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). "Thus, matters involving custody and visitation in paternity
actions should be based on the best interest of the child, as they are in dissolution proceedings." Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. (citing Wishart v. Bates, 531 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998)).
375. Id. Cases cited were Wishart v. Bates, 531 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998) (approving
grandparental visitation rights based upon the best interest of the child in a dissolution proceeding),
Moore v. Travino, 612 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (applying section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) of
Florida Statutes to grandparental visitation rights in connection with a paternity action), and M.J.
v. A.B., 694 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (applying section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) of Florida Statutes
to grandparental visitation rights in connection with a paternity action).
376. Spence, 705 So. 2d at 998.

377. Id.
378. Id.
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With respect to grandparent visitation, the legislature has
provided that grandparents may receive visitation privileges
if that is in the best interest of the child. See §
61.13(2)(b)(2)(c). Because the parents have already
abandoned their right of familial privacy by bringing their
dispute before the court, the court's further consideration of
whether grandparental visitation is in the best
379 interest of the
child is not violative of the right to privacy.
With that, the court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings. 8
Five months later the Third District Court of Appeal, the same court
which determined that section 752.01(l)(a) of Florida Statutes was
constitutional in Von E/ff,38 was given the opportunity to address the
constitutionality of subsection (1)(d) in Ocasio v. McGlothin.382 The
Ocasio case involved a child whose grandparents petitioned for visitation
after the death of the child's father, a situation falling under subsection
born out of wedlock, which brought
(1)(a). 383 However, the child was 3also
84
the case under subsection (1)(d).
The Ocasio court began by stating its disagreement with the prior
panel's decision in Von Eiff,saying, "the grandparent [visitation] statute,
as presently written, is facially unconstitutional for the reasons expressed
in the Von Eiff dissenting opinion., 38' Despite its disagreement, the court
acknowledged that stare decisis required it to "adhere to the Von Eiff
majority decision and affirm" the lower court's determination that
subsection (1)(a) was constitutional. 386 Less than three weeks later, the
Florida Supreme Court would reverse the district court's ruling in Von

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id.
Id. at 999.
699 So. 2d 772, 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
719 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
Id. at 918.
Id. Section 752.01(1)(d) read, at that time:
(1)The court shall, upon petition filed by a grandparent of a minor child,
award reasonable rights of visitation to the grandparent with respect to the child
when it is in the best interest of the minor child if:
(d) The minor child was born out of wedlock and not later determined to be
a child born within wedlock as provided in s. 742.091....

Fr.. STAT. § 752.01(1)(d) (1995).
385. Ocasio, 719 So. 2d at 918.
386. Id. at 918-19.
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Eiff.37 However, because Von Eiffdid not address the constitutionality of
subsection (1)(d), the Ocasio court held that this subsection was facially
unconstitutional under the reasoning of the Von Eiff dissent.388 The
decision was rather hollow, however, because the grandmother was granted
visitation under subsection (1)(a)." 9
In January 2000, the Florida Supreme Court struck down subsection
(1)(d) in Saul v. Brunetti.39° In Saul, the child was born out of wedlock and
the child and his mother lived with the maternal grandparents in the
maternal grandparents' home until the mother was killed in a car accident
when the child was two years of age.39 ' The father then took custody of the
child and the child began living with the father and the paternal
grandparents in the paternal grandparents' home.392 Shortly after the child
began living in his paternal grandparents' home, a dispute arose between
the father and the maternal grandparents. 393 As a result of the dispute, the
maternal grandparents filed an action for visitation rights under section
752.01.
The grandparents did not specify in their petition upon which
subsection they were basing their claim. 395 The trial court awarded
visitation based solely on a best interest analysis.396 There was no claim or
indication in the record that demonstrable harm would result to the child
if visitation were denied.397 The trial court based its decision upon a
determination that "the uncontroverted evidence established that this child
has the unconditional love of Petitioners, Respondent and the paternal
grandparents. It is clearly in the child's best interest to be the recipient of
that unconditional love. 398
While the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the hurt that the
maternal grandparents must feel at losing both a daughter and visitation
with the grandchild, the court nonetheless found that subsection (1)(d)
suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as subsection (1)(a) in Von

387. Ocasio was decided on Oct. 28, 1998. Id. The Florida Supreme Court ruled on Von Eiff
on Nov. 12, 1998. Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 510.
388. Ocasio, 719 So. 2d at918-19.

389. Id. at 919.
390. 753 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. 2000).
391. Id.at 27.
392. Id.

393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.(quoting the unpublished opinion of the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Circuit of

Florida).
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Eiff.399 The court struck down subsection (1)(d) as facially unconstitutional
based not only on its reasoning in Von Eiff,but also on its reasoning in
Beagle.' In explaining its decision, the court acknowledged that Von Eiff
and Beagle could be distinguished from the present case since both of
those cases involved parents who where married at one time, while here
the parents were never married; however, the court stated that the fact that
the parents in the instant case were never married did not change the
court's analysis of the constitutionality of the statute. 4' The court went on
to agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Brunetti
that "[i]f the father of a child born into a marriage has a right of privacy
where the biological mother is deceased, which was the holding in Von
E/if,it follows that the father of an out-of-wedlock child has the same right
of privacy." 4m The Florida Supreme Court explicitly stated that the fact
that the parents of the child were never married did not change the court's
analysis of the constitutionality of the statute4 °3
After the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Brunetti, the only
subsections of the 1993 statute which remain untouched by the Florida
Supreme Court are subsections (1)(b), which gives standing to petition
upon the dissolution of the parents' marriage, 404 and (1)(c), which grants
standing to petition when a parent of the child has desertedthe child.'"5
While the Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of
these subsections, four district courts of appeal have.

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 28.
Id. (quoting Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)).
Id.
Section 752.01(1)(b) of Florida Statutes reads:
(1) The court shall, upon petition filed by a grandparent of a minor child,
award reasonable rights of visitation to the grandparent with respect to the child
when it is in the best interest of the minor child if:
(b) The marriage of the parents of the child has been dissolved....

FLA. STAT. § 752.01(1)(b) (1999).
405. Section 752.01(l)(c) of Florida Statutes reads:
(1) The court shall, upon petition filed by a grandparent of a minor child,
award reasonable rights of visitation to the grandparent with respect to the child
when it is in the best interest of the minor child if:
(C)a parent of the child has deserted the child....
FLA. STAT. § 752.01(l)(c) (1999).
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The First and Second District Courts of Appeal have both addressed the
constitutionality of subsection (1)(b). In October 1998 the First District
Court of Appeal decided Williams v. Spears.4°6 In Spears,the parents were
divorced and the mother had remarried but all three parental figures agreed
that they did not want the child to visit with his maternal grandmother. 0 7
The maternal grandmother filed a petition seeking court ordered visitation
under section 752.01 (1)(b) of Florida Statutes. 40 8 The precedential value of
the Spears decision is lacking because of the date of the decision. Spears
was decided in October 1998'09 and bases some of its reasoning on bad
case law, such as the district court of appeal's decision in Von Eiff.4 '0 The
Florida Supreme Court would rule on Von Eiffonly one month after Spears
was decided. 41 1 The arguments proffered by the parents in Spears were
based on the case law available at the time. The parents argued that the
Florida Statute section 752.01(l)(b) is unconstitutional as appliedto them
because of the privacy guarantee in article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution.412 They also argued that, because all three parental figures
agreed on the decision to deny visitation and because the biological father
and biological mother regularly consulted each other about decisions
regarding visitation, they were functionally equivalent to an intact
family.413 Hence, they deserved protection under the reasoning of Beagle.
Even though it was not asked to, the court chose to address the facial
constitutionality of the statute. The decisions the district court of appeal
chose to frame its own decision within were Beagle, where the Florida
Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to "intact family" situations," 5
and Spence.16 The Spears court stated that the statute was facially
constitutional; however, it based its reasoning on an "intact family"
analysis, as called for by Beagle,417 an analysis which would be expanded
one month later in the Florida Supreme Court's Von Eiff ruling.48 The
district court of appeal said that because it is possible that divorced parents
might disagree about grandparent visitation, "in these cases ...the
Legislature has the prerogative to enact a statute allowing a grandparent to

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

719 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Id. at 1237-38.
Id. at 1237.
The case was decided on Oct. 7, 1998. Id. at 1236.
Von Eiffv. Azicri, 699 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
Spears, 719 So. 2d at 1238.
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1240.
Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996).
Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla.4th DCA 1998).
Spears, 719 So. 2d at 1240.
Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 517 (Fla.1998).
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petition for visitation where it is in the best interest of the child., 4' 9 The
court based this decision on language in Spence which said that by bringing
a family dispute, such as a divorce, before the court, parents abandon their
right to familial privacy and that in such a situation, a court's consideration
of whether grandparental visitation is in the best interest of the child is not
violative of a parental right to privacy.4 20
The Spears decision also lacks precedential value because of faulty
reasoning: the court relied on a best-interest analysis instead of a harm to
the child test.42' The Florida Supreme Court emphasized in Beagle that
there was a parental right to privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution
and that this fundamental right could not be infringed upon unless it was
shown that a demonstrable harm would come to the child.422 The district
court of appeal in Spears made very brief mention of a harm to the child
standard and buried this mention in the third- and fourth-to-last sentences
of the opinion. 423
The Florida Supreme Court explained in detail in Beagle that
subsection (1)(a) was unconstitutional because it allowed visitation without
requiring that a demonstrable harm would come to the child in the absence
of a grant of grandparental visitation. 424 The district court of appeal ignored
the demonstrable harm requirement of the Beagle analysis in concluding
that subsection (1)(b) would be facially constitutional as long as divorced
parents disagreed over whether or not to allow grandparent visitation. 4'
The Spears court did, however, find that subsection (1)(b) was
unconstitutional as applied.4 26 The court based its decision on the fact that
"where shared parental responsibility works as intended, the decisionmaking process of the parents is analogous to that engaged in by parents
married to each other." 427 Because the parents made a joint decision to
deny visitation, the decision was protected.42B The court ruled that the
statute would be unconstitutional "in any application to divorced parents
who are in agreement that a court should not order grandparent
visitation. , 429 One month after the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided
Spears, the Florida Supreme Court destroyed the reasoning in Spears by

419. Spears, 719 So. 2d at 1240.
420. Id. (quoting Spence, 705 So. 2d at 998).

421. Id.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1278.
Spears, 719 So. 2d at 1242.
Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1276-77.
See Spears, 719 So. 2d at 1241-42.
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1241.

428. See id.
429. Id. at 1242.
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receding from its limited decision in Beagle and stating that familial
privacy rights do not depend on the intactness of a family.430
In July 1999, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that subsection
(1)(b) was unconstitutional based on more sound reasoning.43' In Lonon v.
Ferrell,the biological paternal grandparents of a child sought visitation
with the child after the child was adopted by his stepfather, an adoption to
which the child's biological father consented.432 In their petition, the
grandparents did not allege any harm or threat to the child; instead they
only contended that visitation was in the child's best interest.433
The trial court dismissed the action stating that subsections (1)(b) and
(1)(e), upon which the petition could be based, were facially
unconstitutional.434 The grandparents appealed, arguing that because the
parents used the judicial process to dissolve their marriage, they granted
the court system decision-making authority regarding the best interest of
the child 43 -this argument was based on the Spence decision. The Second
District Court of Appeal determined that because Spence "relied somewhat
, 6
on the 'intact family' language in Beagle, 43
and since it-the Second
District Court of Appeal-agreed with the First District Court of Appeal
that the "intact family" limitation in Beagle has no vitality after the Florida
Supreme Court's
decision in Von Eiff, 37 the grandparents' argument had
438
no vitality.
This reasoning by itself would not be enough to dismiss the
precedential value of Spence. In reaching its conclusion that a grandparent
could be granted visitation rights by intervening in a custody dispute, the
Spence court referred to language in the Florida Supreme Court's Beagle
decision, which was separate and distinct from the narrow ruling of Beagle
that subsection (1)(e) was unconstitutional as applied to intact families.439
In the Beagle decision, the Florida Supreme Court chose to call attention
to the fact that, although a "best interest of the child" standard was not
sufficient in a grandparent visitation context where parents in an intact
marriage deny visitation, the "best interest of the child" test still applies to
other family law proceedings."' While the Florida Supreme Court's ruling

430. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 515-16 (Fla. 1998).
431. Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

432. Id. at 651.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 651-52.
436. Id. at 652.
437. Id. (citing S.G. v. C.S.G., 726 So. 2d 806, 811 (Fla. Ist DCA 1999)).

438. Il
439. Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
440. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1277 (Fla. 1996).
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in Von Eiffexpanded the protection of privacy rights for parental decisions
made by parents not part of intact marriages, the Von Eiff decision did not
change the fact that a "best interest of the child" standard is still the
standard applied in other family law proceedings." The part of the Beagle
decision which the Spence court relied upon in stating that a grandparent
might be awarded visitation under a "best interest of the child" standard in
an action under Florida Statute section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) was still good
law, even after Von Eiff."42 The Lonon court was too quick to dismiss the
reasoning of the Spence court." 3
However, the Lonon court further supported its decision by referring to
the appeals court decision in Brunetti.4' The Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Brunetti clarified its decision in Spence by saying that the
proceeding in which a grandparent may intervene to petition for visitation
rights should be a pending proceeding." 5 In Lonon, there was no pending
proceeding and there was no continuing jurisdiction over any custody
issues because the biological father consented to the child's adoption by
the step-father." 6 Hence, the only statutory basis the grandparents had to
petition for visitation rights was subsection (1)(b), and the court found that,
based on the reasoning in Beagle and Von Eiff, section 752.01(1)(b) of
Florida Statutes was facially unconstitutional. 7 The Second District Court
of Appeal stated that a divorced natural parent should have no lesser
privacy rights than a married or widowed natural parent-the marital status
granted privacy rights in Beagle and Von Eiff, respectively. 4 8
The constitutionality of subsection (1)(c), which allows grandparents
to petition for visitation when a parent has deserted the child, 449 has been
indirectly addressed twice. In the first case, Clinebell v. Departmentof
Children & Families,the Fifth District Court of Appeal found subsection
(1)(c) applicable in a case where children were declared dependents."5 The
We emphasize again that our holding in this case is not intended to change the law

in other areas of family law where the best interest of the child is utilized to make
a judicial determination. In issuing this decision, we have no intent to disrupt or

modify the current requirements for best interest balancing in those other areas of
family law proceedings.

Id.
441. See Von Eiff v. Acrizi, 720 So. 2d 510,517 (Fla. 1998).
442. Id.
443. See Lonon, 739 So. 2d at 652.

444. Id.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Lonon, 739 So. 2d at 652.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 652.
FLA. STAT. § 752.01(l)(c) (1999).
711 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
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constitutionality of the subsection was never explicitly addressed, but by
applying Florida Statute section 752.01(1)(c) to support a grant of
grandparental visitation rights, the court implicitly upheld the
constitutionality of the statute. 45'
In Clinebell, the maternal grandparents filed a motion to have their
grandchildren declared dependants.45 The trial court found the children to
be dependents, but withheld adjudication, meaning that the children were
not taken from the custody of their parents.453 The court also granted the
grandparents visitation rights in the same order.4 54 The parents appealed. 455
The court of appeal found that the trial court could grant visitation to the
grandparents based on subsection (1)(c). 456 The court stated that subsection
(1)(c) does not require physical desertion and that neglecting parental
duties to the extent that a child is determined dependent by an appropriate
court is enough to trigger the right to petition under subsection (1)(c). 4"
The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that, when the lower court made
its decision, it
believed that it would be in the best interest of the children if
they were left with their parents so long as the grandparents,
the ones who brought the problem to the attention of the court
in the first place, would continue to monitor the care provided
by the parents. 58
The court based its decision, in part, on faulty law. The court addressed
an argument that its decision was precluded by the Florida Supreme
Court's ruling in Beagle by pointing out that Beagle was limited to "intact
family" situations, reasoning which the Florida Supreme Court would back
away from six months later.459 However, the court also based its decision
on the fact that the grandparent visitation award resulted from a relevant
matter pending in the court system (at a dependency hearing), a reference
to Spence, which was decided three months earlier. 4' The Fifth District
Court of Appeal believed that since the parents were still under the
supervision of the court and since the grandparents were the ones who
brought the matter to the attention of the court system and the grandparents

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Seeid.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.

456. Id.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
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desired to monitor the care the children received, the trial court had the
authority to find that it was in the best interest of the children to grant
grandparent visitation.46'
Fourteen months later, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided L.B.
v. C.A.,' 2 a case with facts nearly identical to Clinebell. The court never
specifically ruled on the constitutionality of subsection (1)(b), but it did
explicitly disagree with the decision reached in Clinebell.4 63 The court
based the disagreement on the fact that the Clinebellcourt made reference
to Beagle and Beagle's limitation to situations of "intact families" in
deciding that Beagle did not preclude a finding that subsection (1)(c) is
constitutional.'" The Fourth District Court of Appeal felt that because the
Clinebell decision was made before Von Eiffthere was no need to certify
conflict with Von Eiff, as the Fourth District Court of Appeal believed
Clinebell
was overruled by the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Von
5
Eiff '
Hence, in regard to subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c), the law appears to be
in a state of disarray. The Spears court declared subsection (1)(b) to be
facially constitutional,' while the Lonon court declared it facially
unconstitutional." 7 Meanwhile, the Clinebell court felt that subsection
(1)(c) was constitutional," 8 whereas the L.B. court felt that Clinebell was
overruled, implying that the fourth district would find subsection (1)(c)
unconstitutional if asked. 469 District court of appeal decisions represent the
law in Florida unless and until overruled by the Florida Supreme Court. 470
Furthermore, all trial judges in Florida are bound by any on-point district
court of appeal decision when their own district has not decided on the
issue. 7 Because district courts of appeal disagree concerning subsections
(1)(b) and (1)(c), it is likely that the Florida Supreme Court will grant
review of cases concerning these subsections in the near future. Given the
outcomes of cases which concerned subsections (1)(a), (1)(d), and (1)(e),
the Florida Supreme Court will likely strike down these two remaining
subsections of Florida Statute section 752.01 in the near future unless the
Florida Legislature makes some changes to the statute.

461. Id.
462. 738 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
463. See id. at 427 ("We disagree with the contrary result reached in Clinebell.").

464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Williams v. Spears, 719 So. 2d 1236, 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
467. Lonon v. Ferrel, 739 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
468. Clinebell v. Dep't of Children & Families, 711 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
469. L:B. v. C.A., 738 So. 2d 425,427 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
470. See Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985) (citing Stanfill v. State, 384
So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980)).
471. See Stanfill v. State, 384So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980).
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VIII. HOW THE LEGISLATURE CAN CLEAR THE PATH TO GRANDMA'S

Clearly, a grandparent visitation statute which does not require a
showing of harm before visitation is granted will not pass constitutional
muster in Florida. In Von Eiff, the Florida Supreme Court alluded to
disapproval of the "shall" language of section 752.01, which mandates that
courts "shall" award visitation to grandparents when it is in the best
interest of the child. 4 2 However, even if the mandatory language is
changed back to discretionary language,473 that would not cure the defect
which the Florida Supreme Court has held to be primary, the lack of harm
to the child requirement.
In response to the Florida Supreme Court's rulings, six Florida House
members presented a new version of the Florida Grandparent Visitation
Statute in March 2000. 4' 4 The proposed statute renews the five grounds
laid out in the 1993 amendment, allowing a grandparent to petition for
visitation with a minor child when
(a) one or both parents are deceased, (b) the marriage of the
parents has been dissolved, whether or not an action is
pending, (c) a parent has deserted the child, (d) the child is
born out of wedlock and not later determined to be born
within wedlock as provided in s. 742.09 1, or (e) the minor is
living with both natural parents who are still married and are
using parental authority to prevent grandparental visitation. 475
The proposed statute also includes a provision (f), which allows a
grandparent to petition for visitation when a deceased parent makes a
written testamentary statement requesting that there be visitation between
the parent's child and the grandparents.476 The proposed statute also calls
for a preliminary hearing to determine whether "there is evidence that the
minor is suffering or is threatened with suffering demonstrable significant
mental or emotional harm as a result of a parental decision not to permit
visitation or contact with the grandparent." 477 Furthermore, the proposed

472. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510,511 (Fla. 1998).
473. The original statute contained discretionary language. The "may" was changed to "shall"
in the 1990 amendment to the statute. See FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1990).
474. H.R. 0423, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (proposed) (The proposal was presented by
Representativ es Kelly, Bainter, Wiles, Melvin, Casey, and Harrington.).
475. Id. (proposing FLA. STAT. § 752.011 to replace FLA. STAT. § 752.01).
476. Id. (proposing FLA. STAT. § 752.011(1)(0).
477. Id. (proposing FLA. STAT. § 752.011(2)).
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statute also states criteria on which the determination of harm should be
based.4 78
The proposed statute calls for mediation before a case can proceed, but
the mediation stage is only reached after the court determines that harm
will come to the child if visitation is not granted; otherwise the petition is
dismissed.47 9 Such a requirement reflects an effort by the Florida house to
follow the advice of the Florida Supreme Court. In Von Eiff,the Court
stated that "[i]f a compelling state interest were to exist, alternatives such
as providing mediation services, counseling, or other non-mandatory (and
non-adversarial) services might facilitate grandparent visitation and build
stronger intergenerational family relationships."4 8
The proposed statute also remedies any confusion that might remain in
light of the Spence decision.4 8' Spence did not decide on the
constitutionality of section 752.0 1(1)(d), which grants standing to petition
for visitation when a child is born out of wedlock, instead choosing to
remand the case to the trial court to decide if visitation could be granted
under 61.13(2)(b)2.c.482 The current version of section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. says
that a court may award grandparents visitation rights if the grandparents
intervene in a custody action and such visitation is in the best interest of
the child-no showing of a harm to the child is required. 483 The Beagle
decision included language stating that the requirement of a showing of
harm to the child before a grant of visitation was limited to grandparent
visitation cases.' In Spence, the court refers to this language in deciding
that a paternity action is a custody action and, since custody actions require
the court to use a best interest analysis, and the grandparent in Spence
intervened in a paternity action, then a best interest analysis applies and the
grandparent may be granted visitation rights.485
Other courts, Lonon, L.B., and Clinebellin particular, have argued that
because Spence was based on language in Beagle and because the narrow
holding of Beagle was later expanded in Von Eiff,the Spence decision is
no longer good law.486 Any confusion as to whether the "best interest of the
child" standard should be replaced by a harm to the child standard in
matters other than grandparent visitation was resolved in August 2000. The
4 87 that
Florida Supreme Court made it clear in Richardson v. Richardson

478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

Id. (proposing FLA. STAT. § 752.011(6)(a)-(n)).
Id. (proposing FLA. STAT. § 752.011(2)-(3)).
Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 517 n.4 (Fla. 1998)..
Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996, 998-99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c. (2000).

484. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1277 (Fla. 1996).

485. Spence, 705 So. 2d at 998.
486. See supra notes 431-71 and accompanying text.
487. 766 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2000).
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a "harm to the child" standard, not a "best interest of the child" standard,
applies to custody matters.488
The Florida House has tried to make the grandparent visitation statute
consistent with other statutes that might permit grandparent visitation. To
bring about consistency, the House has proposed changing the current
"best interest of the child" standard in section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. to a "harm
to the child" standard.489 Hence, under the proposed statute, even if a
grandparent intervenes in a pending custody dispute, the court may award
visitation only after finding that a failure to do so would result in harm to
the child.4 ' 0 The public policy behind doing so would appear to be to
discourage, grandparents from stepping into the marital disputes of their
children in order to ensure visitation rights later on. The practical effect of
the change would be to slam the door shut on any opportunity a
grandparent might have to be granted visitation in the absence of a
showing of harm to the child.
The proposed statute appears to cover all of the points the Florida
Supreme Court has disapproved of, yet the statute will not take effect any
time soon. The Florida Senate approved the Senate version of the bill
unanimously on March 29, 2000.' The House version of the bill passed
two legislative committees and had two more to go before it reached the
floor for a full vote.492 The statute "died in messages" on May 5, 2000,
meaning that it will have to repass the Senate and pass the House before
it can become law.493
488. Id. at 1038. In that case, a child had lived with her maternal grandparents in Pensacola,
Florida, five days a week and visited with her mother on weekends. Id. at 1037. The mother took
the child to North Carolina for Christmas and refused to return. Id. The grandparents petitioned for
custody of the child under section 61.13(7) of Florida Statutes, which allows for a court to
"recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody
arrangements are in the best interest of the child" when the child is actually residing with the
grandparents in a stable relationship. Id. at 1038. The grandparents won at the trial level. Id. at
1037-38. The mother appealed and the district court held that section 61.13(7) was facially
unconstitutional-a violation of article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution-because it
permitted "evaluation of the grandparents' custody request solely upon a best interest standard."
Id. at 1038. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the district court decision. Il at 1037. The Court
based its decision on the reasoning of Beagle and Von Eiffand stated that there was no reason to
distinguish between Beagle and Von Eff and the instant case simply because Beagle and Von Eiff
involved grandparent visitation and the instant caseinvolves a custody decision. Id. at 1040. Hence,
a harm to the child standard now applies to both visitation and custody actions in Florida. See id.
489. S. 288, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (proposed).
490. Id. (proposing a new section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) to the current version of section
61.13(2)(b)2.c.).
491. Beth Reinhard, GrandparentsGet a Boost on Child Visitation Rights, MIAMI HERALD,
March 30,2000, at 9B.
492. Id.
493. Online Sunshine. at http://www.leg.state.fl.uslsession/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 27,
2001).
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Perhaps the House was waiting on the results of Troxel v. Granville.4'
The United States Supreme Court heard arguments on January 12, 2000
and decided the case on June 5, 2000."95 As mentioned before, the United
States Supreme Court's ruling did little to impact grandparent visitation
statutes. 496 The Court based its holding on the "sweeping breadth" of the
statute in question, which allowed any person, at any time, to petition for
visitation rights. 4' The Court also said that because it based its decision on
that breadth, it did not
consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the
Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process
Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include
a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and
need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due
process right in the visitation context."'
Hence, the United States Supreme Court did not create any requirement
that the proposed Florida statute does not cover. The proposed statute is
much narrower than the Washington statute and the proposed statute
includes a requirement of a showing of harm. 499 Furthermore, since the
Florida Constitution's privacy provision is more protective than the United
States Constitution's Due Process Clause,5°° even if the United States
Supreme Court had made a more stringent ruling, the Florida Legislature
would still have to create a bill to conform to the more exacting
requirements of the Florida Constitution. Any postponement of action
based on the United States Supreme Court's ruling is a weak excuse for
failing to act.
Florida is ripe for a solution to grandparent visitation problems. Florida
has the highest per capita population of senior citizens in the nation, 01 and
statistics show that approximately seventy-five percent of senior citizens
nationwide are grandparents." Ironically, the state with the most
grandparents is the same state which puts some of the most stringent

494. 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2064 (2000).
495. Id. at 2054.
496. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
497. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2064.
498. Id.
499. S. 288, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (proposed).
500. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996).
501. Staff Report, Supreme Court to Rule on GrandparentRights, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 10,
2000, at IA.
502. Theresa H. Sykora, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Are the Best Interests of the
GrandparentBeing Met Before Those of the Child?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 753,754 (1996).
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limitations on grandparent visitation rights. Clearly, the elderly population
has influenced the Florida legislature, as evidenced by the legislature's
early attempts to provide grandparents with broad visitation rights. 3 The
Florida Supreme Court, however, has thwarted those attempts. Perhaps
Floridians should be proud to know that their supreme court does not let
emotion cloud decisions." Perhaps concerned grandparents will retire to
states with more empathetic supreme courts, such as Kentucky. 5 Either
way, in Florida, the path to grandma's house has definitely been a long and
winding road. That road has only narrowed with the passing of time and,
as of May 5, 2000, the next turn is unclear. Why the Florida Legislature
has chosen to let the proposed statute die is unclear, but in a state with so
many grandparents, the issue is sure to be revived.
While the legislature works to sculpt a statute which will pass
constitutional muster, perhaps legislators should examine an alternative
route to reaching grandma's. The proposed statute clearly reflects the fact
that the Florida Senate paid close attention to the holdings of the Florida
courts, but in doing so, perhaps it overlooked the common thread amongst
each of those cases. Every grandparent visitation case which has come
before a court was brought into that court because of a dispute between
parents and grandparents. Perhaps if more money were invested in
counseling and mediation, as opposed to litigation, benefits would be felt
by all parties involved.
In counseling and mediation, the focus would shift to the child's
emotional need for visitation as opposed to a more demanding and harsh
requirement of demonstrable harm before the visitation is granted. The
proposed statute will create situations where a child may want to see the
grandparents and the grandparents may be fit, nice people who love the
child and want to see him, but the parents are using the child as a weapon,
as was the case in Hawk and King." 6 The Florida Supreme Court
recognizes that the law cannot override a parental decision, even if that
decision seems wrong, or unfair."' The proposed statute will not afford
families counseling until a preliminary finding of harm has been made.508

503. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 752.01(l)(e) (1999).

504. The court in Beagle said, "it is not our judicial role to comment on the general wisdom
of maintaining intergenerational relationships. We must refrain from expressing our personal
thoughts as either grandparents or future grandparents." Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1277.
505. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992).
506. See id; see also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 So. 2d 573, 576-77 (Tenn. 1993).
507. The court in Beagle said, "It is irrelevant, to this constitutional analysis, that it might in
many instances be 'better' or 'desirable' for a child to maintain contact with a grandparent." Beagle,
678 So. 2d at 1277. This language was also quoted in the court's decision in Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720
So. 2d 510, 516 (Fla. 1998).
508. S. 288, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (proposed) (proposing FLA. STAT. §
752.011(3)).
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Perhaps the legislature has it backwards. If emphasis is placed on the need
for counseling and mediation services first, instead of focusing attention
on fine tuning the statutory scheme already in place, maybe the need for
preliminary hearings for findings of harm would decrease and the number
of grandparents and parents peaceably resolving their conflicts without
needing judicial intervention would increase.
A grandparent visitation statute is not a bad idea; however, if the
ultimate goal of the statute is to ensure that no harm comes to the child by
denying visitation, mediation and counseling would better serve that
interest. Some commentators argue that the litigation which results from
the use of a grandparent visitation statute makes an already emotionally
wrenching situation-since the circumstances which give a grandparent
standing to petition are mostly unhappy: death, divorce, desertion-even
more difficult for the child caught in the middle."0 The adversarial nature
of the judicial system often exacerbates the family dispute at the center of
the denial of grandparental visitation rights."' ° The adversarial system can
make the division between the parents and grandparents even more
pronounced, potentially making it less likely that peace will result
following the adjudication.5 ' Lawsuits can also have a detrimental impact
on the stability of a child's environment due to the intrusions into the
family that accompany litigation.51 Thus, judicial intrusion into the family
unit not only creates instability, but is also an inevitable source of trauma
for the child." 3 Furthermore, judicial intrusion may also affect the parent's
marriage, which in turn affects the emotional welfare of the child.14
Instead of focusing on how grandparents can sue for visitation rights,
the legislature should consider focusing on. making mediation and
counseling the first choice of parties disputing over grandparent visitation.

509. E.g., Harpring, supra note 34, at 1677.

510. Id.
511. Id.
512. See Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparent
Visitations' Statutes,86 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 124 (1986). Shandling noted:
(Tihe impact of a lawsuit on the stability of a child's environment can be
extremely detrimental. It is clear from the psychological literature that a lawsuit

over visitation rights, with its accompanying intrusions by psychological experts
and lawyers and its inevitable disruption of the nuclear family, often creates

extreme anxiety and dislocation for a child.
Id.
513. Sharon Furr Ladd, Note, Tennessee Statutory Visitation Rightsof Grandparentsand the
Best Interests of the Child, 15 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 635, 652 (1985) ("If the natural parents have
a viable marriage, it is not wise to allow parents of either parent to bring suit as this could have a
devastating effect on the marriage.").
514. See Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203,212 (Mo. 1993) (Convington, J., dissenting).
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When parties mediate, they have a hand in creating the remedy, therefore
the agreement can be as specific or general as they choose. 5 Further, the
parties can create a more precisely tailored agreement to fit their needs
516
because they, more so than any judge, are most familiar with the facts.
Mediation also tends to lessen the trauma to the child involved because
"[t]he folklore of domestic relations practice says that negotiated
settlements are usually better adhered to by the parties than are court
judgements," which means that the child is less likely to be subjected to
conflict again in the future.517 Counseling could render the same benefits
as mediation, particularly allowing the parties to express their needs and
concerns and then work with each other to remedy the problem as opposed
to having a court dictate the solution.
Counseling and mediation both have the additional benefit of being less
expensive than litigation. The costs of such litigation can be high indeed.
One author recalled a case in which grandparent litigation cost as much as
$110,000.58 By avoiding a courtroom, that money does not have to be
taken from the family budget and can be spent on other things, such as
college tuition. Additionally, studies show that after spending tremendous
amounts of money on a trial, parties generally do not get results much
better than those they could have obtained in mediation or counseling.1 9
Furthermore, as the discussion of Florida case law shows, after spending
tremendous amounts of money, grandparents in Florida will most likely be
denied visitation rights.52 For less money, the parties could attend
counseling or mediation and reach an agreement that is likely to be more
satisfactory to both sides: grandparents are more likely to get some sort of
visitation privileges and parents are less likely to resent the visitation since
they will be able to maintain control over the type and length of visitation
the grandparents receive.
IX. CONCLUSION

Grandparent visitation is a highly sensitive issue, especially in Florida
where the senior citizen population is so large. Although bad grandparents
do exist, the pervasiveness of the stereotype of loving grandparents makes
it hard to envision a situation where a child would not benefit from contact
with his grandparents. For that reason, many courts have fallen prey to
515. Harpring,supranote 34, at 1678.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Jeffrey W. Doeringer, GrandparentVisitation: Dead or Alive?, 42 ORANGE COUNTY
LAW. 32,38 (2000).
519. Harpring, supra note 34, at 1678.
520. No court to date has found that demonstrable harm will come to the child absent a grant
of grandparental visitation rights.
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sentimentality when deciding whether or not to grant grandparents
visitation rights. However, more objectivejudges, such as Justice Lambert
in his dissenting opinion in King, have stressed that sentimentality has no
place in the law. 52' This objective view is the view taken by the Florida
Supreme Court. Both the Federal and Florida constitutions convey rights
of privacy. Among those privacy rights lies the right of parents to raise
their child as they see fit. Case law has honed and refined the parameters
of this right and, while it may seem unfair or unwise to deny loving
grandparents the right to visit their grandchild, based on a long line of
federal and state precedent it is clear that the Florida Supreme Court is
correct in deciding that, absent some showing of harm to the child, a court
cannot override a fit parent's decision. Case law shows that, absent a
grandparent proving harm to the child, visitation is rarely granted. A statute
which demands such a showing of harm, while technically correct because
it adheres to judicial rulings, will do little to help grandparents attain
visitation with their grandchildren. The better solution would be to shift the
focus away fromjudicial intrusions upon families and instead help families
resolve their disputes themselves through mediation and counseling.

521. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 683 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
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